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NOTE
SEEKING ENLIGHTENMENT FROM ABOVE:
CIRCUIT COURTS SPLIT ON THE INTERPRETATION
OF THE REFORM ACT'S HEIGHTENED PLEADING
REQUIREMENT
INTRODUCTION
The private securities litigation system is essential to the
integrity of American capital markets. Private securities litiga-
tion is an invaluable tool with which defrauded investors can
regain their losses without resorting to government assis-
tance.' For these reasons, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission ("SEC" or "Commission") has frequently stressed the
importance of private actions under the federal securities
laws.2 These actions help deter wrongdoing, thereby supple-
menting the SEC's own enforcement efforts. The system, how-
ever, is undermined by abusive and frivolous lawsuits.4 To
' Statement of Managers, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
1995 WL 709276 [hereinafter Statement of Managers]; see also Frank v. Cooper
Indus., SEC Litigation Release No. 14356 (Dec. 15, 1994), 58 S.E.C. Docket 697,
1994 WL 707203.
2 Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985);
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975); J.I. Case Co.
v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1964); see also Frank v. Cooper Indus., SEC Liti-
gation Release No. 14356, 58 S.E.C. Docket 697, 1994 WL 707203 ("The Commis-
sion has consistently stressed the importance of and supported private rights of
action under the antifraud provisions of the securities laws."); Arthur Levitt, Be-
tween Caveat Emptor and Caveat Vendor: The Middle Ground of Litigation Re-
form, Remarks at the 22nd Annual Securities Regulation Institute, San Diego,
California (Jan. 25, 1995).
' Indeed, in Bateman Eichler, the Court recognized that it has "repeatedly ...
emphasized that implied private actions provide 'a most effective weapon in the
enforcement' of the securities laws and are 'a necessary supplement to Commission
action.' " 472 U.S. at 310 (quoting Borak, 377 U.S. at 432 and citing Blue Chip
Stamps, 421 U.S. at 730); see also Frank v. Cooper Indus., SEC Litigation Release
No. 14356, 58 S.E.C. Docket 697, 1994 WL 707203; John W. Avery, Securities Liti-
gation Reform: The Long and Winding Road to the Private Securities Litigation Re-
form Act of 1995, 51 BUS. LAW. 335, 336 (1996).
" See Statement of Managers, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, reprinted in 1995
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curb this abuse, Congress enacted the Private Securities Liti-
gation Reform Act of 1995 ("Reform Act" or "Act").' In doing
so, however, Congress has unleashed a flood of litigation to
clear up ambiguities in the statute.
Among the most litigated provisions of the Reform Act is
the pleading standard for scienter (the required state of mind)
in private securities fraud litigation. To date, six circuit
courts-the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Ninth, and Elev-
enth-have rendered conflicting decisions regarding what Con-
gress intended when it enacted the Reform Act. Additionally,
there is dicta from the Fourth Circuit on this issue. These
decisions cry for clarity and uniformity from the Supreme
Court.6
This Note provides an overview of the circuit court conflict,
the impact this conflict has on securities regulation, and the
need for the Supreme Court's guidance on the scienter issue.
Part I discusses the road to the Reform Act, including the
impetus behind the legislation. Part II states the holdings of
the circuit court cases that have construed the Reform Act and
articulates the SEC's position on the scienter issue. Essential-
ly, seven circuits have spoken on the issue, following three
different lines of interpretation. Part III analyzes the Reform
Act's plain language and legislative history to show why the
Supreme Court, if petitioned, should conclude that Congress
did not change the substantive standard for scienter when it
enacted the Reform Act. Rather, it altered the nature of the
allegations needed to allege scienter. Furthermore, this Note
will demonstrate why the Supreme Court should find that the
required state of mind for private securities fraud actions could
be pleaded through circumstantial evidence of conscious misbe-
havior or recklessness but not through allegations of motive
and opportunity to commit fraud.
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 1995 WL 709276.
Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)-(2)
(2000)).
6 At this time, no cases have petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934' and
Rule 10b-5'
Government regulation of securities transactions emerged
as part of the aftermath of the market crash in 1929. 9 During
the Great Depression, Congress promulgated the Securities Act
of 19330 ("1993 Act") and the Securities Exchange Act of
193411 ("Exchange Act") to encourage investor confidence in
United States securities markets and thereby, to stimulate the
investment necessary for capital formation, economic growth,
and job creation.12 The 1933 Act provides investors with full
disclosure of material information regarding public securities
offerings and protects investors against fraud. 3 By imposing
specified civil remedies, Congress intended for the 1933 Act to
promote ethical standards of honesty and fair dealing in secu-
rities transactions." The Exchange Act provides for regulation
of transactions upon securities exchanges and in over-the-coun-
ter markets. 5 With the primary intention of safeguarding
investors from manipulation of stock prices, the Exchange Act
imposes regular reporting requirements on corporations whose
stock appears on national securities exchanges. 6
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act makes it unlawful for
any person "[t]o use or employ, in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of any security.., any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regu-
7 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
8 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001).
' See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 (1976).
10 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. (1933)).
'1 48 Stat. 891 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 72a et seq. (1934)).
12 See Pub. L. No. 104-67, Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, S.
REP. NO. 104-98 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 1995 WL 372783.
' See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 195 (citing H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 1-5 (1933)).
14 See id. While both the 1933 Act and the Exchange Act contain express civil
remedies and criminal penalties, Congress realized that a strict statutory regime
would not efficiently regulate securities trading. See id. Therefore, as part of the
Exchange Act, Congress created the SEC, which is provided with "an arsenal of
flexible enforcement powers." Id. (citing examples in both the 1933 Act and the
Exchange Act of the SEC's enforcement power).
1 Id.; see also S. REP. No. 73-792, at 1-5 (1934).
16 See S. REP. No. 73-792, at 1-5.
2000]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
lations as the Commission may prescribe." 7 Under this Sec-
tion, the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5, which declares it un-
lawful "[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading." 8 To allege securities fraud
under either § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must show that
the defendant (1) made a misstatement or omission, (2) of a
material fact, (3) with scienter, (4) on which the plaintiff re-
lied, (5) that proximately caused his injury. 9 The plain lan-
guage of § 10(b) does not create a civil remedy for its viola-
tion.20 Moreover, neither Congress, 2' nor the Commission
when adopting Rule 10b-5,22 envisioned such a remedy. None-
theless, courts have found that Congress implicitly sanctioned
such actions, and it is now well-established that § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 give litigants a private right of action in securities
fraud cases.23 However, since § 10(b) lawsuits are a creature of
the courts and not the legislature, judges have vast discretion
in determining their parameters.2 4 As a result, conflicting le-
gal standards have developed, creating considerable uncertain-
ty and the occasion for abuses of, amongst others, professional
firms, investors, and issuers.
'7 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (Supp. 2000).
18 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001).
19 See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 199 n.18; Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187
F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Ross v. Bank South, N.A., 885 F.2d 723,
728 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc)).
20 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); see also Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 196.
21 Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 196 (citing Note, Implied Liability Under the Secu-
rities Exchange Act, 61 HARV. L. REV. 858, 860 (1948)); see also S. REP. No. 104-
98, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 1995 WL 372783 ("Congress has never
expressly provided for private rights of action when it enacted Section 10(b).").
" Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 196 (citing Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193
F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir. 1952)).
' See, e.g., Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 196; Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas.
Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971); see also S. REP. No. 104-98, reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 1995 WL 372783.
24 See S. REP. No. 104-98, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 1995 WL
372783.
" See id. ("The lack of congressional involvement has left judges free to de-
velop conflicting legal standards.").
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B. Setting the Stage: What is All the Fuss About?
On December 22, 1995, over President Clinton's veto,
2
the Reform Act became effective, ending a long legislative
effort to revise both the substantive and procedural law gov-
erning private actions under the federal securities laws.2 ' The
Reform Act was intended to address concerns about abusive
practices in securities class action lawsuits.28 To comprehend
the need for such reforms, it is necessary to review the genesis
of the Reform Act.
Supporters of the Reform Act, including accountants, secu-
rities firms, and the high technology industry, believe that
they are victims of "strike suits'"-actions filed whenever there
is a sudden fall in a company's stock price.2 ' These suits al-
lege that the issuer and its agents fraudulently misled share-
holders by misrepresenting a company's operations or perfor-
mance to inflate its stock price.3" Securities class action critics
claim that plaintiffs' attorneys file "strike suits" against deep
"' Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Veto Message from the
President of the United States, H.R. DOC. NO. 104-150, reprinted in 141 CONG.
REC. H15,214 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995), available at 1995 WL 752858 [hereinafter
Veto Message]. See infra note 204 and accompanying text.
' For a comprehensive study of the road leading to the Reform Act, see gen-
erally Avery, supra note 3.
" Indeed, Senator D'Amato remarked, "There is broad agreement on the need
to reform. Shareholders' groups, Corporate America, the SEC, and even lawyers all
want to curb abusive practices." S. REP. NO. 104-98, reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 1995 WL 372783 (citation omitted). In the conference report, the
committee members announced that the purpose of the Reform Act was to restrict
abuses in securities class action litigation, including the following: (1) the practice
of filing lawsuits against issuers of securities in response to any significant change
in stock price, regardless of defendant's culpability; (2) the targeting of "deep pock-
et" defendants; (3) the abuse of the discovery process to coerce settlement; and (4)
the manipulation of clients by class action attorneys. Statement of Managers, H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 104-369, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 1995 WL 709276.
" See Statement of Managers, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 1995 WL 709276; see also Robert J. Giuffra, Jr., CEO's Beware:
The Strike Suit Lives, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 1999, at A45 (discussing the danger
of strike suits) [hereinafter Giuffra, Strike Suit]. Strike suits are defined as "share-
holder derivative action[s] begun with [the] hope of winning large attorney fees or
private settlements, and with no intention of benefitting [the] corporation on behalf
of which [the] suit is theoretically brought." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 992 (6th ed.
1990). The Supreme Court made the class action feasible in corporate disclosure
suits in its decision in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, which validated the "fraud on the
market" theory. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
" See Giuffra, Strike Suit, supra note 29, at A45.
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pocket defendants-regardless of any underlying culpabili-
ty-solely for their settlement value.3' These lawyers file suits
alleging "a laundry list of cookie-cutter complaints" against
companies within hours or days after a company announces
unexpected bad news." When the complaint is filed, plaintiffs'
attorneys often abuse the discovery process by imposing bur-
densome costs on defendants with the faint hope that discovery
requests will uncover some plausible claim not alleged in the
complaint.33
These abusive practices can wreak havoc on the business
sector.34 The dynamics of private securities fraud lawsuits
generate powerful incentives to settle, making securities class
actions settle at a significantly higher rate than other types of
class actions.35 For defendants, the massive discovery costs
create enormous pressure to settle, thereby forcing even inno-
cent parties to settle frivolous securities class actions.36 Even
3 See Statement of Managers, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 1995 WL 709276.
32 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-50, at 16 (1995), available at 1995 WL 79795.
' See id.; see also S. REP. NO. 104-98, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679,
1995 WL 372783.
14 Indeed, as Senator Dodd recognized, "The flaws in the current private secu-
rities litigation system are simply too obvious to deny. The record is replete with
examples of how the system is being abused and misused." S. REP. NO. 104-98,
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 1995 WL 372783 (citation omitted). Senator
D'Amato concurred, noting that "I]awyers who bring meritorious suits do not bene-
fit when strike suit artists wreak havoc on the Nation's boardrooms and court-
houses. Our economy does not benefit when the threat of litigation deters capital
formation." Id. (citation omitted).
" The House Committee on Commerce remarked on the impact of class ac-
tions:
Whether a shareholder lawsuit is meritorious or not, the corporation sued
must spend a great deal of money to defend itself. It is common for a
corporation simply to agree to a substantial settlement out of court. De-
spite the absence of wrongdoing by managers, corporations are essentially
forced to pay large sums of money to avoid even larger expenses associ-
ated with legal defense. This has been described by some as legal extor-
tion. Advocates of litigation reform cite empirical studies that show virtu-
ally all claims in a 10b-5 class actions, meritorious or not, are settled.
The settlement bears no relationship to the underlying damages, but
instead is related principally to the amount claimed or the defendant's
insurance coverage.
Joel Seligman, The Private Securities Reform Act of 1995, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 717,
721 (1996) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 104-50, at 15).
6 See Statement of Managers, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 1995 WL 709276.
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if a company is willing to bear the expense of litigation, it
inevitably settles rather than face a potentially injurious jury
verdict.37 For example, one commentator noted that if the po-
tential damages are $100 million, and it will cost $3 million to
bring the case to trial, then if a company's chances of ultimate-
ly winning are 90%, it may be a wise business decision to set-
tle for a portion of $13 million, which is the discounted likeli-
hood of losing plus attorney's fees. 8 Indeed, of the approxi-
mately 300 private securities lawsuits filed every year, almost
93% settle, at an average cost of $8.6 million." These settle-
ments are usually based on the size of the defendants' pockets
and not on the merits of the case.40
At the same time, abusive litigation threatens the invest-
ing public by undermining a pillar of federal securities
laws--disclosure to investors of information about the financial
condition of publically traded companies.4 Private securities
litigation under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 can restrict the free
and open communication among management, analysts, and
investors." Indeed, according to the SEC, "[Tihe threat of
mass shareholder litigation, whether real or perceived, has had
detrimental effects."" Fearing a lawsuit if their projections
37 See H.R. REP. No. 104-50, at 17, available at 1995 VTL 79795.
" See Edward Brodsky, Circuit Split on Stock Fraud Scienter Pleading Stan-
dard, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 8, 1999, at 3 (citing Private Litigation under the Federal
Securities Laws: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 103 Cong. 104-05 (1993) (statement of
Edward R. McCracken, President, Silicon Graphics)); see also S. REP. No. 104-98,
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 1995 WL 372783 ("The settlement value to
defendants turns more on the expected costs of defense than the merits of the
underlying claim.").
19 S. REP. No. 104-98, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 1995 WL 372783
(citation omitted).
"o See id.; Statement of Managers, H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, reprinted in
1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 1995 WL 709276.
41 Statement of Managers, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 1995 WL 709276 ("[Tihe investing public and entire U.S. econo-
my have been injured by the unwillingness of the best qualified persons to serve
on boards of directors and of issuers to discuss publicly their future prospects,
because of fear of baseless and extortionate securities lawsuits.").
42 S. REP. No. 104-98, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 1995 WL 372783
(recognizing the need to encourage the voluntary disclosure of information by issu-
ers).
" In fact, SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt remarked, "There is no denying that
there are real problems in the current system-problems that need to be addressed
not just because of abstract rights and responsibilities, but because investors and
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fail to materialize, risk-adverse corporate managers are unwill-
ing to discuss publicly their future business plans."' As a re-
sult, investing becomes more risky because "investors often
receive less, not more, information."45 Furthermore, investors
are the ultimate losers when outrageous settlements are paid
by issuers. When an insurer must pay attorneys' fees and set-
tlement payments, and spend management and employee re-
sources in defending frivolous lawsuits, the issuers' own inves-
tors suffer.4 6 A survey of venture-backed companies existing
for less than ten years revealed that one in six had been sued
at least once and that these cases consumed an average of
1,055 hours of management time and $692,000 in legal fees."
C. Pre-Reform Act Standards
The standards for pleading scienter were relatively well-
established prior to the enactment of the Reform Act. Before
the Reform Act, the Second Circuit employed the most strin-
gent pleading standard for scienter among the circuits.48 In a
markets are being hurt by litigation excess." Id. (citing Arthur Levitt, Between
Caveat Emptor and Caveat Vendor: The Middle Ground of Litigation Reform, Re-
marks at the 22nd Annual Securities Regulation Institute, San Diego, California
(Jan. 25, 1995)).
" See Statement of Managers, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 1995 WL 709276; S. REP. No. 104-98, reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 1995 WL 372783 (recognizing that the threat of litigation has
caused corporate management to refrain from providing shareholders forward-look-
ing information about their companies).
" See S. REP. No. 104-98, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A-N. 679, 1995 WL
372783.
" Indeed, the Conference Committee recognized that investors are always the
"ultimate losers" when issuers are forced to pay extortionate settlements. State-
ment of Managers, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 1995 WL 709276. Similarly, the Council for Institutional Investors remarked,
"We are . . . hurt if a system allows someone to force us to spend huge sums of
money in legal costs by merely paying ten dollars and filing a meritless cookie
cutter complaint against a company or its accountants when that plaintiff is disap-
pointed in his or her investment." S. REP. No. 104-98, reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 1995 WL 372783 (citation omitted).
47 See S. REP. No. 104-98, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A-N. 679, 1995 WL
372783 (citation omitted). For an additional discussion of the background to the
Reform Act, see U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of General Coun-
sel, Report to the President and the Congress on the First Year of Practice under
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (April 1997), at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/lreform.txt [hereinafter SEC General Counsel Re-
port].
"' In its conference report, Congress described the Second Circuit's standard as
[Vol. 66: 2
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§ 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 securities fraud case, the Second Circuit
required plaintiffs to allege "particular facts that give rise to a
strong inference of fraudulent intent."49 In the Second Circuit,
plaintiffs could establish scienter by alleging either (1) facts
"that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of conscious
misbehavior or recklessness" or (2) facts to show that defen-
dants had "both motive and opportunity to commit fraud.""
This was in direct contrast to other circuits that applied a
more lenient standard. For example, the Ninth and Third Cir-
cuits allowed plaintiffs to aver scienter generally, requiring
only a mere statement in the complaint that scienter existed,
instead of specific facts supporting the allegation. 1 Neverthe-
less, by allowing plaintiffs to plead mere motive and opportuni-
ty to commit fraud, the Second Circuit has undermined its pur-
portedly strict pleading standard.52 Indeed, the Second Circuit
recently admitted that it has been "lenient in allowing scienter
issues to resist summary judgment based on fairly tenuous
inferences."53
D. The Supreme Court's "'Contribution" to Scienter-Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder
The Supreme Court has provided little guidance to lower
courts in the area of securities litigation, especially regarding
the scienter pleading standard. In Ernst & Ernst v.
"the most stringent pleading standard." Statement of Managers, H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 104-369, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 1995 WL 709276; see also, e.g.,
In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 548 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting that
before the Reform Act, the Second Circuit applied the "most stringent test" regard-
ing how a plaintiff may plead scienter under § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5).
" Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994); accord In re
Time Warner, Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 269 (2d Cir. 1993).
" Shields, 25 F.3d at 1128. This standard remained unchanged following the
Reform Act's passage. See, e.g., Stevelman v. Alias Research Inc., 174 F.3d 79, 84
(2d Cir. 1999); Press v. Chem. Inv. Serv. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir. 1999);
Chill v. Gen. Elec. Co., 101 F.3d 263, 267 (2d Cir. 1996).
" See, e.g., In re Glenfed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1545-47 (9th Cir.
1994); Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 285 (3d Cir. 1992).
"' See Robert J. Giuffra, Jr., Pleading Scienter under the PSLRA, N.Y.L.J., July
22, 1999, at 5 [hereinafter Giuffra, Pleading Scienter].
" Press, 166 F.3d at 538 (citing SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450,
1467 (2d Cir. 1996) ("Whether or not a given intent existed is, of course, a ques-
tion of fact.") and In re Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 270-71 ("Whether a given intent
existed is generally a question of fact.")).
20001
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
Hochfelder,54 the Supreme Court defined "scienter" as "a men-
tal state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or de-
fraud."55 In doing so, the Court rejected lower court decisions
that allowed civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for
negligent conduct. The Court noted that § 10(b) prohibits the
use of "any manipulative or deceptive contrivance" in violation
of SEC rules, and it held that "[tihe words 'manipulative or
deceptive' used in conjunction with 'device or contrivance'
strongly suggest that § 10(b) was intended to proscribe know-
ing or intentional misconduct."" While the Hochfelder Court
expressly declined to consider whether reckless behavior could
suffice for civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, it ac-
knowledged that "[iun certain areas of the law recklessness is
considered to be a form of intentional conduct for purposes of
imposing liability for some act."57 Following Hochfelder, but
before the Reform Act, virtually all the circuit courts that have
considered the issue have held that some form of "reckless-
ness" could satisfy the scienter element.5 However, the termi-
nology of "recklessness" varies widely among the circuits, with
some courts allowing recklessness approaching gross negli-
gence to suffice, while others have held that conscious disre-
gard or deliberate recklessness is required." Nevertheless,
54 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
' Id. at 194.
Id. Thus, as a threshold matter, to establish liability under § 10(b), a plain-
tiff must assert in his complaint that the defendant acted with sufficient scienter.
See SEC v. United States Envtl. Inc., 155 F.3d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 1998).
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 194 & n.12.
' See, e.g., SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Hollinger v.
Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1569 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc); McDonald v.
Alan Bush Brokerage Co., 863 F.2d 809, 814 (11th Cir. 1989); In re Philips Petro-
leum Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1244 (3d Cir. 1989); Van Dyke v. Coburn Enter.,
Inc., 873 F.2d 1094, 1100 (8th Cir. 1989); Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114,
1117-18 (10th Cir. 1982); Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 961-62 (5th
Cir. 1981) (en banc); Mansbach v. Prescott, 598 F.2d 1017, 1024 (6th Cir. 1979);
Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 692 (1st Cir. 1978); Rolf v. Blyth Eastman
Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 47 (2d Cir. 1978); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem.
Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1044 (7th Cir. 1977).
"9 See Giuffra, Pleading Scienter, supra note 52, at 5. Indeed, as Giuffra noted:
As matters now stand, some courts require plaintiffs to plead "mere reck-
lessness," whatever that means, while others require "conscious disregard"
or "deliberate recklessness." This uncertainty has turned litigation of
motions to dismiss and for summary judgment in securities class actions
into a game of roulette, the outcome of which depends on how a particu-
lar judge defines recklessness in a particular case.
[Vol. 66: 2
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most of the federal courts of appeals have generally adopted
the definition of recklessness espoused by the Seventh Circuit
in Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp.6" In Sundstrand,
the court stated:
[R]eckless conduct may be defined as a highly unreasonable omis-
sion, involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable negligence,
but an extreme departure from the ordinary standards of ordinary
care, and which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers
that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor
must have been aware of it.
61
E. Passage of the Reform Act
Since § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims involve allegations of
fraudulent conduct, courts have required that they be pleaded
according to Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.62 This rule requires that when a plaintiff asserts fraud,
"the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stat-
ed with particularity."63 Although Rule 9(b) applies a height-
ened pleading requirement to securities fraud cases, the Su-
preme Court in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores' rec-
ognized that "litigation under Rule 10b-5 presents a danger of
vexatiousness different in degree and kind from that which
accompanies litigation in general."5 The Court further noted
that baseless claims of securities fraud tend to "delay the nor-
Id. Compare Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1283 (11th Cir. 1999)
(requiring "severe recklessness"), with In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d
542, 550 (6th Cir. 1999) (requiring mere 'recklessness"), and In re Silicon Graphics
Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 977 (9th Cir. 1999) (requiring "deliberate recklessness").
Nonetheless, all three courts cite the definition of "recklessness" articulated in
Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977).
60 553 F.2d 1033. See infra notes 93, 102, 107 & 116 and accompanying text.
" Sundstrand, 553 F.2d at 1045 (quoting Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev.
Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719, 725 (W.D. Okla. 1976)).
62 See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
6 However, Rule 9(b) allows malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of
the mind of a person to be averred generally. Id. The Third Circuit noticed that
this provision of Rule 9(b) is inconsistent with the Reform Act's requirement that
plaintiffs "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference of scien-
ter." For this reason, the court found that the Reform Act supercedes Rule 9(b) as
it relates to Rule 10b-5 actions. In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 531
(3d Cir. 1999).
" 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
6 Id. at 739-44.
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mal business activities of a corporate defendant" while the
plaintiff embarks on a fishing expedition of business docu-
ments in hopes of finding relevant evidence.66 Similarly, Con-
gress acknowledged that Rule 9(b) failed to prevent abusive
practices by private litigants.67 In fact, Congress expressed
the same concerns that the Supreme Court voiced in Blue Chip
Stamps, recognizing that frivolous securities fraud litigation
"unnecessarily increase [s] the cost of raising capital and chill [s]
corporate disclosure, [and is] often based on nothing more than
a company's announcement of bad news, not evidence of
fraud."68 Moreover, the circuit courts could not agree on a uni-
form interpretation of Rule 9(b), resulting in vastly different
applications of the rule among the courts.69
Therefore, in an attempt to create uniformity among the
circuits and to protect "investors, issuers and all who are asso-
ciated with our capital markets" from abusive litigation, Con-
gress promulgated the Reform Act."0 This amendment to the
Exchange Act makes many changes to the private securities
litigation system. One of the most notable modifications enact-
ed by the Reform Act is the heightened pleading standard,
which requires that:
In any private action arising under this chapter in which the plain-
tiff may recover money damages only on proof that the defendant
acted with a particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with re-
spect to each act or omission alleged to violate this chapter, state
with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the
defendant acted with the required state of mind."
" In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 548 (6th Cir. 1999) (discuss-
ing Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 741).
', Statement of Managers, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 1995 WL 709276 ("[Rlule [9(b)] has not prevented abuse of the
securities laws by private litigants.").
S . REP. No. 104-98, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 1995 WL 372783.
" Statement of Managers, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 1995 WL 709276 ([T]he courts of appeals have interpreted Rule
9(b)'s requirements in conflicting ways, creating distinctly different standards
among the circuits.").
,0 Id. Senator Domenici stated that he expected the Reform Act to "return
some fairness and common sense to our broken securities class action litigation
system, while continuing to provide the highest level of protection to investors in
our capital markets." S. REP. NO. 104-98, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 1995
WL 372783 (citation omitted).
7" 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2000).
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The Reform Act also provides that failure to meet this require-
ment may, on the defendant's motion, result in dismissal of the
claim.72
Even though Congress intended the Reform Act to create a
uniform requirement for pleading scienter in securities fraud
cases, the Act has failed to achieve that goal.73 In fact, five
years after its passage, there is confusion and contradiction
among the circuit courts over the stringency of the "strong
inference" standard. 4 Although Congress has admitted that
the Reform Act's "strong inference" language is based partly on
the pleading standard followed by the Second Circuit, it has
explicitly declined to adopt the Second Circuit's lenient case
law interpreting the factual showing necessary to create the
requisite strong inference.75 Thus, courts have no guidance on
what characteristic patterns of facts may be pleaded to estab-
lish the "required state of mind," and, as a result, they have
applied three different approaches.
II. THE CiRcurr COURT SPLIT
As stated above, the lengthy congressional debate concern-
ing the Reform Act concentrated on whether to adopt the Sec-
ond Circuit's two-prong pleading standard for scienter. While
the standard imposes a requirement that pleadings raise a
"strong inference" of scienter, it enables plaintiffs to meet that
burden merely by alleging facts that show that the defendant
had the motive and opportunity to commit fraud or that the
defendant was reckless.76 When interpreting the Reform Act,
" Id. § 78u-4(b)(3)(A).
" Edward Brodsky, Scienter Under the Reform Act of 1995, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 14,
1999, at 3 (noting that the Act has failed to standardize the requirements for
pleading scienter in securities fraud actions) [hereinafter Brodsky, Scienter]. For a
thorough discussion of the immediate impact of the Reform Act on the effective-
ness of the securities law and on investor protection, see generally SEC General
Counsel Report, supra note 47.
14 Brodsky, Scienter, supra note 73, at 3.
"5 In the Statement of Managers, Congress stated that "[tihe Conference Com-
mittee language is based in part on the pleading standard of the Second Cir-
cuit . . . [but the Conference Committee] does not intend to codify the Second
Circuit's case law interpreting this pleading standard." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-
369, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 1995 WL 709276.
7" See Press v. Chem. Inv. Serv. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir. 1999).
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circuit courts have taken three different approaches. Basically,
there are two issues that the courts are grappling with. First,
did the Reform Act alter the "required state of mind" (scienter)
requirement for actions brought under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
or is some form of recklessness still sufficient as a substantive
threshold for a plaintiff seeking to establish scienter?" Sec-
ond, did the Reform Act restrict the factual evidence that may
be alleged to establish a "strong inference" of scienter?" Pre-
cisely, are the two pre-Reform Act evidentiary methods articu-
lated by the Second Circuit still available to show scienter?79
So far, the Second and Third Circuits have found that the
Second Circuit's permissive motive and opportunity or reck-
lessness standard still satisfies the Reform Act's heightened
pleading requirement, and the SEC agrees. By contrast, the
First, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have all rejected the
Second Circuit's motive and opportunity standard, finding that
the evidentiary base is not enough to establish a strong infer-
ence of scienter. ° Instead, those circuits have each employed
a more stringent standard. Additionally, the Fourth Circuit
" See Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 191 (1st Cir. 1999). Initial-
ly, the scienter debate focused on pleading standards, namely whether the Second
Circuit's long-established motive and opportunity test, or some more stringent
standard, applied post-Reform Act. However, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Silicon
Graphics added an additional issue: whether pleading recklessness still suffices as
the substantive "state of mind" requirement under the Reform Act.
78 See id. at 191-92.
71 See id.
"' Press is not the final word from the Second Circuit. Recently, the Second
Circuit heard an appeal from Novak v. Kasaks, in which the court considered the
pleading standard for scienter under the Reform Act. See 997 F. Supp. 425, reh'g,
26 F. Supp. 2d 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), vacated by 216 F.3d 300 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
121 S. Ct. 567 (2000). The district court ruled that "evidence of motive and oppor-
tunity no longer suffices to plead scienter," and it dismissed the complaint. Id. at
430. The Second Circuit recognized the split in authority regarding the proper
interpretation of the Reform Act's new pleading requirement, particularly the de-
bate concerning whether allegations of motive and opportunity to commit fraud are
sufficient to plead scienter, and it noted the Reform Act's "conflicting expressions
of legislative intent." Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 310-11 (2d Cir. 2000). Ulti-
mately, the Second Circuit held:
[Tihe [Reform Act] adopted our "strong inference" standard . . . . Al-
though litigants and lower courts need not and should not employ or rely
on magic words such as "motive and opportunity," we believe that our
prior case law may be helpful in proving guidance as to how the "strong
inference" standard may be met.
Id. at 311.
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has chimed in with dicta regarding the scienter issue. The in-
terpretations and standards of all seven circuits, and the opin-
ion of the SEC, are detailed below."'
A. The First Line of Cases
1. The Second Circuit: Press v. Chemical Investment
Services Corp. 2
In February, 1999, the Second Circuit in Press declared
that Congress "heightened the requirement for pleading scien-
ter to the level used by the Second Circuit."83 In Press, the
't The approach in the Fifth Circuit is still indefinite. See Williams v. WMX
Techs. Inc., 112 F.3d 175, 178 (5th Cir. 1997). In Williams, without mentioning
scienter and without any analysis, the court held that, under the Reform Act, the
necessary pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) in a securities fraud action could be
established by the Second Circuit's two-prong approach. Id.; see also Bryant, 187
F.3d at 1283 n.20 (discussing Williams).
However, at least one district court in the Fifth Circuit that has addressed
the pleading issue in the context of a § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 action has determined
that pleading motive and opportunity is no longer acceptable to establish scienter.
See In re Parachelsus Corp. Sec. Litig., No. H-96-3464, 1998 WL 1108373 at *3
(S.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 1998). In In re Parachelsus, the court distinguished Williams on
the ground that Williams pertained to Rule 9(b), rather than § 10(b) or Rule 10b-
5, actions. See id. at *8 n.2.
Currently before the Fifth Circuit is an appeal from In re Zonagen Inc. Secu-
rities Litigation, where the circuit court will confront this issue in the context of a
§ 10(b) claim. See Nathanson v. Zonagen, No. 99-20449 (5th Cir. 1999). Relying on
Williams, the district court found that the Reform Act codified the Second Circuit
pleading standard, but it ruled that the plaintiffs failed to meet that standard. In
re Zonagen Inc. Sec. Litig., No. H-98-0693 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 1999). The Commis-
sion has filed an amicus brief urging that the Reform Act does not depart from
the Second Circuit standard. See Miranda S. Schiller & Howard W. Murage, Cir-
cuit Courts Divided on What 'Scienter' Means Under New Standards of Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act, SEC. L. WKLY., Oct. 20, 1999, at 27 n.9 (discuss-
ing the recent judicial developments in the Fifth Circuit).
For a brief general discussion of the "most important" federal court decisions
in the Reform Act's first year of enactment and the practical problems of litigating
under the Reform Act that have come to light in the first year of enactment, see
SEC General Counsel Report, supra note 47, at Part IV.
12 166 F.3d 529 (2d Cir. 1999). For a discussion of federal district courts that
have held that the Reform Act essentially codified the Second Circuit approach,
see Richard H. Walker & J. Gordon Seymour, Recent Judicial Developments
Affecting the Private Securities Fraud Class Action, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1003, 1025 &
n.124 (1998) (discussing and citing cases).
' The court adopted the pre-Reform Act two-prong standard enunciated in
Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994), which allows
plaintiffs to allege either motive and opportunity to commit fraud or strong cir-
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buyer of a T-bill brought a claim under § 10(b) against the
brokerage firm because the firm had delayed paying funds to
him upon maturity of his T-bill, thereby creating a windfall for
the broker-dealer.84 To plead scienter, Press alleged that the
brokerage firm had a motive to keep possession of his proceeds
for its own use, and that the brokers had the opportunity to do
so because the proceeds of the T-bill at maturity were in their
control."5 Finding that Press "barely alleged motive and op-
portunity," the court concluded that he nonetheless satisfied
the pleading standards. 6 In doing so, however, the court did
not engage in any evaluation of the Reform Act's text or its
much debated legislative history, and it ignored Congress'
express refusal to codify the Second Circuit's case law. Ulti-
mately, the court dismissed Press' claim without regard to the
issue of pleading scienter.87
cumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness. See Press, 166 F.3d
at 538. The Second Circuit standard was first announced in Ross v. A.H. Robins
Co., 607 F.2d 545, 558 (2d Cir. 1979). There, the Second Circuit stated, "It is
reasonable to require that the plaintiffs specifically plead those events which they
assert give rise to a strong inference that the defendants had knowledge of the
[true facts] or recklessly disregarded their existence." Ross, 607 F.2d at 558.
84 Press, 166 F.3d at 532-34.
8$ Id.
8 Id. However, while the Second Circuit has resisted accepting general allega-
tions of scienter, the court stated that it is not inclined to create a "nearly impos-
sible pleading standard when the 'intent' of a corporation is at issue." Id. Indeed,
it recognized that to require more in pleading of motive, would make it "virtually
impossible to plead scienter in a financial transaction involving a corporation,
institution, bank, or the like that did not involve comments from a corporate indi-
vidual." Id. at 538.
8 The court dismissed the complaint on the basis that it failed to plead two
essential elements of a § 10(b) claim: materiality and reliance. Press, 166 F.3d at
538. For this reason, one commentator has termed the Press court's language re-
garding scienter as dicta. He reasons that since the complaint was dismissed with-
out regard to pleading scienter, it was not necessary for the court to determine if
scienter was present, let alone articulate the proper standards for it. See Giuffra,
Pleading Scienter, supra note 52, at 5.
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2. The Third Circuit: In re Advanta Corp., Securities
Litigation88
The Third Circuit in In re Advanta reached the same re-
sult as the Second Circuit in Press; however, unlike the Second
Circuit, it embarked on a comprehensive evaluation of congres-
sional intent.89 Nevertheless, the court accorded the legisla-
tive history negligible weight, terming it "contradictory and
inconclusive.""0 Instead, the court focused on the Reform Act's
language. Recognizing that the text of the Reform Act "closely
mirrors language employed by the Second Circuit," the court
held that Congress' use of the "strong inference" language
compels the conclusion that the Reform Act adopts a method of
pleading "approximately equal in stringency to that of the
Second Circuit."9 The court noted that this requirement al-
lows plaintiffs to allege "with particularity" facts that give rise
to a strong inference of scienter as a basis for liability, but that
"blanket assertions of motive and opportunity," such as "catch-
all allegations," undermine Congress' rigorous standard and
are no longer sufficient.92 Furthermore, the court was consis-
tent with the Second Circuit in accepting recklessness as a
sufficient basis for liability.93 The class action in In re
Advanta was brought by the shareholders of Advanta against
" 180 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 1999). This case was decided on June 17, 1999.
' See id. at 531-35; see also Steven B. Rosenfeld, Circuit's Differ on Meaning
of Pleadings Requirement for Scienter under the Private Securities Litigation Re-
form Act of 1995, NAT'L L.J, Sept. 6, 1999, at B7 (discussing the Third Circuit's
analysis).
" In fact, the court stated that "there is little to gain in attempting to recon-
cile the conflicting expressions of legislative intent . . . . The legislative history on
this point is contradictory and inconclusive, and we are reluctant to accord it
much weight." In re Advanta, 180 F.3d at 533.
1 The court noted that except for the Reform Act's "state with particularity"
requirement, "the two standards are virtually identical." Id. at 533.
2 The court found this interpretation to be consistent with Congress' goal of
curbing meritless securities litigation because in circuits that had not employed
the Second Circuit standard, plaintiffs would now have to allege facts creating a
strong inference of scienter. Id. at 535. Moreover, in circuits that had previously
applied the Second Circuit standard, the Reform Act's requirement that plaintiffs
plead facts creating the requisite state of mind 'with particularity" would repre-
sent a heightening of the standard. Id.
3 In doing so, the Third Circuit affirmed its adherence to the Sundstrand
standard for recklessness. See id. (citing McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190,
1197 (3d Cir. 1979) (quoting Sundstrand, 553 F.2d at 1045)).
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the corporation and several of its officers. The plaintiffs alleged
that the defendants made false and misleading statements and
material omissions regarding the company's earnings potential
and value of its stock in violation of § 10(b).94 The court dis-
missed the claim, holding that the plaintiffs failed to meet the
pleading standard by alleging "conclusory assertions" and "bare
inferences" that the defendants knew of the wrongdoing. 5
B. The Second Line of Cases
1. The Sixth Circuit: In re Comshare, Inc. Securities
Litigation
96
A month after In re Advanta, the Sixth Circuit put itself at
odds with the Second and the Third Circuits by holding that
the pleading of mere motive and opportunity, standing alone,
is not sufficient to establish scienter 7 Nonetheless, the court
recognized that facts regarding motive and opportunity may be
"relevant to pleading circumstances from which a strong infer-
ence of fraudulent scienter can be inferred"8 and may, at
times, "rise to the level of creating a strong inference of reck-
less or knowing conduct."99 Moreover, the court noted that
such evidence has never been held to constitute scienter for
liability purposes: "[T]hose courts addressing motive and op-
portunity in Securities Act cases have held only that facts
showing a motive and opportunity may adequately allege sci-
enter, not that the existence of motive and opportunity may
support, as scienter itself, liability under § 10(b) or Rule 10b-
5."1° Thus, the Sixth Circuit did not adopt the Second
Circuit's two prong pleading standard, and in rejecting the
standard, it refused to evaluate the Act's legislative histo-
ry.'O Instead, finding the Reform Act's language "unambigu-
" In re Advanta, 180 F.3d at 528.
" Id. at 540.
" 183 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 1999).
" Id. at 551. Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit stated that plaintiffs could estab-
lish a strong inference of scienter if they alleged facts that demonstrated motive
and opportunity to commit fraud, while simultaneously demonstrating that the
defendant acted with the required state of mind-recklessly or knowingly. Id.
" Id. (quoting In re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F. Supp. 238, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
I d.
1o0 In re Comshare, 183 F.3d at 551.
"' In fact, the Sixth Circuit's analysis did not center on whether the Reform
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ous," it applied a plain interpretation of the text and concluded
that scienter could be proven by alleging facts "giving rise to a
strong inference of recklessness," defined as "a mental state
apart from negligence and akin to conscious regard."102 The
plaintiffs in In re Comshare alleged that Comshare's officers
sold stock while knowingly or recklessly disregarding account-
ing errors that prematurely recognized revenue from sales of
its products, thereby artificially inflating the value of the com-
pany's stock in violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.1 Ulti-
mately, the court dismissed the claim, holding that the plain-
tiffs failed to allege facts showing that the revenue recognition
errors should have been obvious or that Comshare consciously
disregarded "red flags" that would have revealed the errors
before discovery, and therefore, they failed to prove the req-
uisite scienter element. 104
2. The Eleventh Circuit: Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc.1
0 5
The Eleventh Circuit in Bryant cited its "basic agreement"
with the "middle course" employed by the Sixth Circuit.
1 6
Thus, the court held that the Reform Act does not prohibit the
practice of alleging scienter by pleading "facts that denote
severe recklessness"" v but that the Reform Act does not
Act codified the pre-existing Second Circuit pleading standard. Rather, the court
embarked on its own interpretation of the Reform Act based solely on the lan-
guage of the statute. See id. at 549 ("Setting aside the pre-[Reform Act] Second
Circuit pleading test in favor of a plain interpretation of the [Reform Act] . . ").
12" On the issue of recklessness, the Sixth Circuit is consistent with the Second
and Third Circuits in holding that the Reform Act did not alter the substantive
threshold for scienter and that recklessness still satisfies the scienter element. The
Sixth Circuit affirmed that it followed the Sundstrand recklessness standard, citing
the identical language relied upon by the Third Circuit for the definition of reck-
less conduct. Compare id. at 550, with In re Advanta, 180 F.3d at 535.
10 In re Comshare, 183 F.3d at 547, 553.
10 Id. at 553.
1 187 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 1999).
1 Id. at 1283. In so deciding, the court specifically rejected the view represent-
ed by the Ninth Circuit in Silicon Graphics to the extent that the Ninth Circuit
"suggests that Congress intended [the Reform Act] to raise the substantive state of
mind requirement." Id. at 1284 n.21.
17 While the court used a unique term-"severe recklessness"--the Eleventh Cir-
cuit noted that " 'severe recklessness,' like the actionable level of scienter in most
other circuits, was based on the Seventh Circuit's formulation of recklessness in
[Sundstrand]." Id.
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adopt the Second Circuit's motive and opportunity test.'
Like the Sixth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that
motive and opportunity may be relevant to a showing of sci-
enter, but that such allegations, without more, are not a suffi-
cient basis for liability."9 The shareholder plaintiffs in
Bryant had similar claims to those in In re Comshare; specifi-
cally, they alleged that Avado Brands, Inc. made false and
misleading statements and material omissions regarding the
negative effects of an expansion strategy to maintain the high
price of its stock."' Since Bryant was an interlocutory appeal,
the court did not apply its evaluation of the Reform Act to the
facts of the case. Instead, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the
district court's dismissal of the claim and remanded the case
for further proceedings."'
3. The First Circuit: Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc. 1
As the most recent player to weigh in on the pleading
standards conflict, the First Circuit issued an opinion in line
with the Sixth and the Eleventh Circuits regarding what a
plaintiff must allege to satisfy the Reform Act's heightened
pleading standard."' In its analysis, the court in Greebel, like
... Id. at 1283. In determining that the Reform Act did not change the existing
scienter requirement, the court emphasized the "well-established and uniformly
recognized precedent" throughout the country, which holds that scienter encom-
passes reckless behavior, to illustrate congressional intent to keep recklessness as
a sufficient basis for liability. Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1286, 1284; see also infra Part
III.A.2 (discussing the contemporary legal context in which Congress promulgated
the Reform Act).
o' Indeed, the court characterized the motive and opportunity prong as "lesser-
known, lesser accepted, and certainly not well-established," and it rejected the test
as inconsistent with the clear purpose of the Reform Act, which is to curb abusive
securities litigation. Id. at 1286-87.
11o Id. at 1273-74.
... Id. at 1286. On remand, the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Georgia dismissed the plaintiffs' claims, finding that "the Plaintiffs' alle-
gations, though probative of scienter to some degree, do not compel the inference
that the Defendants either knew or recklessly disregarded the truth when making
the statements listed in the amended complaint." Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc.,
100 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1386 (M.D. Ga. 2000).
112 194 F.3d 185 (1st Cir. 1999).
113 Id. at 197 ("Our view of the act is . . . close to that articulated by the Sixth
Circuit."). In Greebel, like in In re Comshare, the First Circuit's analysis did not
center on whether the Reform Act adopted the Second Circuit's methods of plead-
ing scienter. In fact, the Greebel court stated that the debate over the adoption or
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the court in In re Advanta, found the legislative history incon-
clusive on whether the Reform Act was meant to incorporate or
to reject the Second Circuit's pleading standards.114 The court
found that the Reform Act left the meaning of scienter intact
because the Act itself does not address the substantive defini-
tion of scienter and the legislative history shows no intent to
alter the substantive contours of scienter.11' Accordingly, the
First Circuit reinstated its previous definition of recklessness,
as narrowly defined by the Seventh Circuit, as a means of
proving the requisite state of mind.1 1 This definition, the
court stated, "does not encompass ordinary negligence and is
closer to a lesser form of intent."1 7 Regarding the evidentiary
standard sufficient to raise a strong inference of recklessness,
the First Circuit rejected the argument that facts showing
motive and opportunity can never be enough to permit the
drawing of a strong inference of scienter 1 However, the
court cautioned that simply pleading motive and opportunity,
regardless of the strength of the inferences to be drawn of
scienter, is insufficient.119 The plaintiffs in Greebel were dis-
contented shareholders of FTP Software, Inc. who brought suit
against the corporation and its officers following a significant
decline in the price of FTP's stock.2 ' The shareholders al-
rejection of the Second Circuit standard was "besides the point" because the First
Circuit has never used the categorization of patterns of facts as acceptable or
unacceptable to prove scienter or to prove fraud. Instead, the First Circuit ex-
plained its approach as ad hoc-"analyz[ing] the particular facts alleged in each
individual case to determine whether the allegations were sufficient to support
scienter." Id. at 196 (citing many examples of the type of evidence that the court
has considered relevant to support scienter).
.. In fact, the only agreement at the congressional level that the court noted
was "an agreement to disagree on the issue of Second Circuit standards (other
than the strong inference standard)." Id. at 195.
... See id. at 198-99.
.. In coming to this conclusion, the First Circuit noted that the Second, Third,
Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits all ruled that the Reform Act did not change
the pre-existing substantive contours of scienter and adhere to the definition of
recklessness espoused by the Seventh Circuit in Sundstrand. See Greebel, 194 F.3d
at 199-200.
... Id. at 199.
... Id. at 197.
... Id. Furthermore, the First Circuit, like the Third Circuit, cautioned that
"catch all allegations that defendants stood to benefit from wrongdoing and had
the opportunity to implement a fraudulent scheme are [not] sufficient." Id. (quoting
In re Advanta, 180 F.3d at 535).
0' Greebel, 194 F.3d at 188.
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leged that FTP failed to disclose the threats to its continued
success, as well as several "questionable" sales practices.121
The First Circuit dismissed the complaint, ruling that the
plaintiffs failed to explain why their allegations gave rise to a
strong inference of scienter.
4. The Fourth Circuit: Phillips v. LCI International,
Inc. 122
Like its sister circuits, the Fourth Circuit noted that the
Reform Act did not change the standard of proof that a plain-
tiff must plead, or the type of evidence that a plaintiff must
allege, to establish scienter in private securities fraud litiga-
tion." Nonetheless, the court did not determine which plead-
ing standard best achieves congressional intent because the
stockholders "failed to allege facts sufficient to meet even the
most lenient standard possible under the [Reform Act], the
two-pronged Second Circuit test."124 Even though the oppor-
tunity to rule on the issue was absent, the Fourth Circuit re-
marked that to demonstrate scienter, a plaintiff "must still
prove that the defendant acted intentionally, which may per-
haps be shown by recklessness."1 25 Regarding the definition
of recklessness, the court cited a definition from a Seventh Cir-
121 One such allegation was that FTP routinely inflated its earnings by improp-
erly booking, as revenue, sales that were actually contingent transactions.
Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants regularly "whited out" the contingency terms
inserted into customer's purchase orders. Id. at 189. Unfortunately for the plain-
tiffs, the only evidence on this allegation was inadmissible as hearsay. Id. at 191.
Therefore, even though the court found that the "white out" allegations, on their
face, seemed "powerful" enough to raise a strong inference of fraud, the court
dismissed the complaint. See id. at 201-02.
122 190 F.3d 609 (4th Cir. 1999).
12 Id. at 620 (citing In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 548 (6th
Cir. 1999)) (dicta).
124 Id. at 621, 620. When making this statement, the court noted the different
approaches to evidentiary standards espoused by the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Cir-
cuits, remarking that the Ninth Circuit view was most restrictive of the three. Id.
at 620-21.
1 Id. at 620 (dicta); see also Krim v. Coastal Physician Group, Inc., No. 98-
2361, 1999 WL 1008975, at *1 (4th Cir. Nov. 8, 1999) (per curium) (declining to
decide the requisite pleading standard because the complaint failed under any
standard but noting that the Reform Act requires a strong inference of scienter to
survive a motion to dismiss).
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cuit case, Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co.,"6 containing lan-
guage identical to Sundstrand, the definition adopted by the
Second, Third, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits.'27 The plaintiffs
in Phillips were former shareholders who had sold their stock
in LCI shortly before a public announcement of a merger.'28
They alleged that the company's Chairman of the Board and
CEO violated § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by making a statement
that constituted a material misrepresentation designed to
defraud the market by artificially underrating the value of LCI
stock.129 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant
of a motion to dismiss, ruling that the plaintiffs failed to allege
both a material misstatement 3 ' and facts that adequately
pleaded scienter." 1
C. In a Class by Itself The Ninth Circuit, In re Silicon
Graphics Inc. Securities Litigation".2
As the third circuit to rule on the scienter issue, the Ninth
Circuit adopted a notably stringent and unique scienter stan-
dard that makes Silicon Graphics the most extreme case in the
Reform Act conflict. In a 2-1 decision, the court held that the
Reform Act requires plaintiffs to plead "particular facts giving
rise to a strong inference of deliberate recklessness, at a mini-
mum,... to satisfy the heightened pleading standard.""'
523 54 F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977).
12 See Phillips, 190 F.3d at 621.
121 Id. at 612-13.
'2 Id. at 613.
.. Id. at 615.
131 Id. at 620, 621. The court noted that the plaintiffs' complaint failed to allege
sufficient specific facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendants acted
with a reckless or conscious effort to defraud, Phillips, 190 F.3d at 621, or that
the defendants had a motive to defraud. Id. at 622-23. The court did, however,
recognize that there was an opportunity to defraud. Id. at 621.
1.. 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999).
"' Id. at 974 (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit's opinion was amended on
August 4, 1999. The original July 2, 1999 opinion stated that a plaintiff must
plead "particular facts giving rise to a strong inference of intent," rather than "a
strong inference of deliberate recklessness" to establish scienter. 68 U.S.L.W. 2,
July 13, 1999, at 1029 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, considering that the Ninth
Circuit's interpretation of recklessness incorporates intentional conduct, see infra
text accompanying notes 137 & 138, it is doubtful that the amended opinion will
have any significant impact on the original one. See John F.X. Peloso & Stuart M.
Sarnoff, Pleading Scienter Under the Reform Act, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 21, 1999, at 3
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The court recognized that the Reform Act does not address
whether motive and opportunity or circumstantial evidence of
"simple recklessness" is sufficient to raise a strong inference of
deliberate recklessness.' Analyzing the legislative history,
the court concluded that Congress intended to raise the plead-
ing requirement beyond that of the Second Circuit, and there-
fore, facts demonstrating "mere recklessness" or a motive and
opportunity to commit fraud are no longer sufficient to estab-
lish the requisite scienter.'35 Like the Sixth and Eleventh
Circuits, however, the Ninth Circuit remarked that facts prov-
ing motive and opportunity to commit fraud may provide some
reasonable inference of intent, even if they are not sufficient to
establish a strong inference of scienter.'36 Instead, to show a
strong inference of deliberate recklessness, plaintiffs must
allege facts that "come closer to demonstrating intent."'37
While the Ninth Circuit noted its adherence to the Sundstrand
definition of recklessness, embraced by its sister circuits, the
court employed an extremely strict interpretation of the defini-
tion that renders recklessness akin to "a form of intentional or
knowing conduct."'38 Indeed, the court indicated that reck-
lessness only satisfies scienter under § 10(b) if "it reflects some
degree of intentional or conscious misconduct."" 9 The class
action plaintiffs in Silicon Graphics were investors who filed a
("Although the analysis was lengthier and the concept of 'deliberate recklessness'
expanded, the ruling in [Silicon Graphics] did not change ... ").
... By "simple" or "mere" recklessness, the court was referring to the standard
adopted by the Second Circuit and followed by the First, Third, Sixth, and Elev-
enth Circuits. See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 977. In his dissent, Judge James
R. Browning stated that the language of the Reform Act is unambiguous, and
therefore, the majority was wrong to resort to legislative history. See id. at 992
(Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He noted that there is
no support anywhere in the Reform Act's text for concluding that proof of reckless-
ness or motive and opportunity to commit fraud are not sufficient to meet the
"strong inference" standard. See id. Rather, Judge Browning recognized that the
fact that the Reform Act makes no mention of recklessness or motive and opportu-
nity as adequate methods of pleading scienter demonstrates the Act's breadth and
flexibility, not ambiguity. See id. (citations omitted).
.. Id. at 974.
13 Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 974.
137 Id.
13 Id. at 976-77.
"' Notably, the court neglected to distinguish "deliberate recklessness" from its
prior definition of "recklessness." See id. at 977; see also infra note 159 (discussing
how the Ninth Circuit, without explanation, disregarded precedent).
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§ 10(b) action, alleging that the price of shares was artificially
inflated because of the defendant's false and misleading state-
ments about the company's business and future prospects. 4 '
Even though the complaint raised "some inference of intent," it
lacked "sufficient detail and foundation necessary to meet
either the particularity or strong inference requirements of the
[Reform Act] .141
D. The SEC's View
Throughout the circuit court conflict, the SEC has stead-
fastly advocated that the Reform Act adopts the Second
Circuit's two-prong pleading standard." Indeed, as amicus
in Greebel, the SEC articulated its interpretation of the Reform
Act's scienter provisions, stating that the Act allows scienter to
be pleaded by alleging facts that either (1) constitute strong
circumstantial evidence of recklessness or conscious misbehav-
ior by the defendant or (2) prove motive and opportunity to
commit fraud on the defendant's part.4 4 Accordingly, the
Commission was "disappointed" with the Ninth Circuit's con-
clusion that the Reform Act precluded liability under § 10(b) or
Rule 10b-5 unless the plaintiff proved reckless behavior that
evidenced intent.'" The Commission has routinely supported
"' Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 980-83.
141 The Silicon Graphics majority emphasized that the complaint lacked details
concerning who drafted and received the reports, how the plaintiff learned of
them, and "countless specifics" about their contents, information the dissent re-
marked "is neither expected nor required at the pleading stage," and could only be
ascertained if the plaintiffs obtained the reports before trial discovery-an unlikely
occurrence. See id. at 999 (Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
14 See Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 192 n.6 (1st Cir. 1999)
(discussing the position of the SEC, as amicus).
" Id. ("While the SEC's views are not binding, they deserve consideration.");
accord Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1285 (11th Cir. 1999).
14 Through a spokesman, the SEC said, "We are disappointed with [the 9th
Circuit's] holding and hopeful that the 9th Circuit will rehear the case en banc."
SEC. L. DAILY, July 7, 1999, at d2; see also Brief for the SEC, amicus curiae, In
re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999) (Nos. 97-16204,
97-16240), at http'//wvv.sec.gov/news/extra/silicon.txt [hereinafter Silicon Graphics
Brief]. In fact, the plaintiffs' bar in Silicon Graphics petitioned the court for a
rehearing en banc, but the court denied the petition on October 27, 1999. See 195
F.3d 521 (9th Cir. 1999). However, five of the Ninth Circuit judges filed a forceful
dissent, arguing that the majority decision "ignores the plain directives of Con-
gress, casts aside the prior decisions of this court, and creates a striking conflict
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a recklessness standard for § 10(b) liability in private secu-
rities actions, and it urges forcefully that the Reform Act made
no changes to the definition of scienter.'45 In support of its
position, the SEC emphasized, as this Note demonstrates, that
all the courts of appeals that have considered the issue have
held that recklessness suffices to establish liability. "6
III. INTERPRETATION OF THE REFORM ACT
As evidenced above, there is extensive disagreement
among the circuit courts regarding the proper interpretation of
the Reform Act's heightened pleading requirement. Some
courts, like the Sixth Circuit in In re Comshare, found the
statutory language unambiguous and refused to analyze the
Reform Act's legislative history when evaluating the Act.'47
By contrast, the Ninth Circuit in Silicon Graphics relied heavi-
ly on legislative history to support its analysis of the Reform
Act's pleading requirements.' However, neither the text nor
the legislative history of the Act are indisputably clear on the
scienter issue, and neither shows any agreement on the types
of evidence that may be offered to prove a strong inference of
scienter. As the First Circuit recognized, all that can be said
with certainty is that Congress agreed on the need to curb
meritless lawsuits, that it endeavored to do so by means of
what are expressed as procedural requirements, and that there
with our fellow circuits." Id. at 522.
145 Silicon Graphics Brief, at http'//www.sec.gov/news/extra/silicon.txt; see also
Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 995 (Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (discussing the SEC's position); infra Part III.A.4 (discussing the policy
considerations in support of recklessness as a basis for liability).
"' Silicon Graphics Brief, at http://www.sec.gov/new/extra/silicon.txt; see also
Walker & Seymour, supra note 82 at 1028 (discussing the SEC's position).
147 The Sixth Circuit employed a "plain interpretation" of the Reform Act and
criticized the district court for overlooking "well-settled principles of statutory con-
struction and the unambiguous language" of the Act by first examining legislative
history to ascertain congressional intent on whether the pre-Reform Act Second
Circuit pleading standards should apply. In re Comshare, 183 F.3d at 551. The
First and Third Circuits evaluated the legislative history, found it equivocal on the
scienter issue, and resorted to the Act's language to support its holding. See
Greebel, 194 F.3d at 192; In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 533 (3d
Cir. 1999).
14 See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 977-79. Indeed, the Silicon Graphics court
was the only court in this conflict to accord such heavy weight to the legislative
history of the Reform Act.
[Vol. 66: 2
INTERPRETING THE REFORM ACT
was consensus on the language of the Act and on little
else.149 Therefore, it is necessary to analyze both the substan-
tive and procedural issues raised by this controversial legisla-
tion.
A. The Substantive Issue: Plain Language and the
"Recklessness" Controversy
It is a well-established maxim that statutory interpreta-
tion begins with the words of the statute."' Courts may re-
sort to a view of congressional intent or legislative history only
when the statute's language is ambiguous. 5' Congress would
save courts a lot of frustration if Congress stated its intent
expressly in the text of statutes. However, in a complex area of
the law like securities regulation, it is impossible to draft legis-
lation covering every conceivable fact scenario.'52 Therefore,
when members of Congress disagree, they will occasionally
draft legislation broadly (and, consequently, ambiguously), as
they did with the Reform Act, and leave it to the courts to
wrestle with the appropriate fact patterns. 53
Unfortunately for courts, the Reform Act's provision re-
garding scienter is recognized more for the language it ex-
cludes rather than the terms it includes. The Reform Act re-
quires a complaint to "state with particularity facts giving rise
to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the re-
quired state of mind."54 However, the Act neglects to define
the substantive threshold required to establish the required
"state of mind,"55 and it is silent on what evidence can create
..9 See Greebel, 194 F.3d at 192.
' ' E.g., Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1283 (11th Cir. 1999)
(citing Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108
(1980)); Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 977 (citing Northwest Forest Resource Coun-
cil v. Glickman 82 F.3d 825, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996)).
... E.g., In re Comshare, 183 F.3d at 549 (citing Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm'n, 447 U.S. at 108)).
... See Giuffra, Pleading Scienter, supra note 52, at 5.
'" Id.
154 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2000).
' See, e.g., Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 199 (1st Cir. 1999)
("The Act itself is silent on the general scienter requirements for [Rule] 10b-5 ac-
tions referring only to scienter as the 'required state of mind.' "); Bryant, 187 F.3d
at 1284 ("The 'required state of mind' is not defined by the Reform Act."); In re
Comshare, 183 F.3d at 549 ("[No provision of the [Reform Act] defines the re-
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the requisite "strong inference" of scienter"'5 Nonetheless,
except for the Ninth Circuit, courts have found that the Re-
form Act's standard does not purport to change the substantive
law of scienter (the required state of mind for securities fraud
actions),"5 7  and the SEC agrees.' Indeed, the Silicon
Graphics court was the first and only circuit court in this de-
bate to arrive at the remarkable conclusion that the Reform
Act precluded pleading "mere" recklessness as a sufficient
basis for liability under § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5, a holding that is
inconsistent with both the plain language and policy of the Re-
form Act."5 9
1. Legislative History6
Congress almost resolved the recklessness issue expressly
in the terms of the Reform Act. The initial House draft of the
Act would have eliminated liability based on recklessness in
securities fraud cases. 6' However, following amendments
quired 'state of mind' in cases involving § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5.").
1. See, e.g., Greebel, 194 F.3d at 195 ("[Tjhe words of the Act neither mandate
nor prohibit the use of any particular method to establish an inference of scien-
ter."); In re Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 977 (9th Cir. 1999) ("[Tlhe
[Reform Act) is silent as to the central issue: the text of the [Reform Act] does
not state whether motive and opportunity or circumstantial evidence of simple
recklessness are sufficient to raise a 'strong inference' of [scienter].").
... See, e.g., In re Comshare, 183 F.3d at 549-50 (noting that the Reform Act
did not change the scienter standard that a plaintiff must prove to prevail in
securities fraud cases; rather, it changed what a plaintiff must plead in his com-
plaint in order to survive a motion to dismiss); Greebel, 194 F.3d at 199-200;
Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1283; Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 995-96 (Browning, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"' See generally Silicon Graphics Brief, at http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/-
silicon.txt.
... When adopting a "deliberate recklessness" standard, the Silicon Graphics
court disregarded prior case law. Ninth Circuit precedent included an en banc
opinion that plainly held that proving recklessness satisfied the scienter require-
ment for a § 10(b) action. See Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564,
1564 (9th Cir. 1990)(en banc). In Hollinger, the Ninth Circuit included a detailed
description of what constitutes reckless conduct and nowhere does the description
indicate that the correct standard is actually something termed "deliberate reck-
lessness." See id. at 1569. Indeed, the new "deliberate recklessness" standard was
invented by the Silicon Graphics panel, which offers no explanation of how this
new standard diverges from the Hollinger recklessness standard.
" For a detailed account of the legislative history of the Reform Act, see
Avery, supra note 3, at 346-53.
.. Procedurally, the House bill provided that a complaint alleging securities
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and hearings in the House Subcommittee on Telecommunica-
tions and Finance, the bill finally adopted by the House im-
posed liability for recklessness. 112 After considerable debate
over the definition of recklessness, the House bill ultimately
defined reckless conduct according to the standard adopted by
the Seventh Circuit in Sundstrand and followed by virtually
all circuit courts of appeals.'63 Nonetheless, the final version
of the Reform Act not only neglects to provide for an express
recklessness standard, but it also meticulously avoids any
suggestion that recklessness is or is not sufficient for civil
liability under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act." Any provisions
fraud must plead "specific facts" demonstrating that the defendant acted with the
requisite scienter. In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 531 (3d Cir.
1999) (quoting H.R. 10, 104th Cong. § 204 (1995)).
'e Apparently, the revised bill also contained a more stringent pleading stan-
dard. It required the plaintiff to "make specific allegations [in the complaint]
which, if true, would be sufficient to establish scienter as to each defendant at the
time the alleged violation occurred." See id. (quoting H.R. 1058, 104th Cong. § 4
(1995)). Rejecting a proposed amendment that would have diluted the pleading
standard, the House retained this language in the final version of the bill. See id.
Shortly after the House bill was passed, the Senate passed its own version of the
Reform Act. See infra note 199 (discussing the pleading standard included in the
Senate bill).
" This standard is "a highly unreasonable omission not merely simple, or even
inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary
care, and which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either
known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware of
it." Sundstrand, 553 F.2d at 1045 (citations omitted). The final House bill added a
second sentence, which provided that "[dleliberately refraining from taking steps to
discover whether one's statements are false or misleading constitutes recklessness."
H.R. 10, 104th Cong. § 204. It is uncertain what extent, if any, this additional
sentence would have changed the result in any particular case.
' Avery, supra note 3, at 370. Recognizing that the provisions of the Reform
Act created confusion in the federal courts, Congress restated and clarified its
intention when promulgating the Reform Act. In 1998, Congress enacted the Secu-
rities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat.
3227 (1998) (the "Standards Act"). Although the Standards Act did not modify or
amend the text of the Reform Act, its Conference Report clarified that "tilt is the
clear understanding of the managers that Congress did not, in adopting the Re-
form Act, intend to alter the standards of liability under the Exchange Act." Joint
Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, Conference Report to Ac-
company S.1260, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-803, at 13 (1998), available at 1998 WL
703964.
Similarly, the Senate Report that accompanied its version of the Act states
that "the Committee emphasizes that the clear intent in 1995 and our continuing
intent in this legislation is that neither [the Reform Act] nor [the Standards Act]
in any way alters the scienter standard in federal securities fraud suits." S. REP.
No. 105-182, at 11 (1998), available at 1998 WL 226714.
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from the earlier forms of the bill that would have given some
recognition to the recklessness standard were removed from
the final bill.
2. The Contemporary Legal Context
Even though Congress refused to expressly adopt a reck-
lessness standard in the Reform Act, courts assume that Con-
gress was well aware of the "contemporary legal context" sur-
rounding the "state of mind" requirement for § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 liability and, by its silence, left the requirement undis-
turbed in the Reform Act.'65 Indeed, every circuit court to ad-
dress the question before the Reform Act's passage held that
proving recklessness was adequate to allege scienter."6' Con-
gress was definitely aware of this well-established precedent
when it drafted the Reform Act. In fact, the Eleventh Circuit
found it clear that when Congress codified the "state of mind"
requirement, it was codifying the settled law that recklessness
was sufficient to allege scienter.5 7 Therefore, even though
the "required state of mind" is not defined by the Reform Act,
the Act does not erase the well-settled understanding that
scienter could be sufficiently alleged by pleading facts indicat-
ing reckless behavior.16
Nevertheless, the Third Circuit denounced these clarifications and stated that
its analysis was "unaffected" by this subsequent legislative history. In re Advanta,
180 F.3d at 533. It concluded that even though Congress tried to clarify its intent,
"some uncertainty may still persist." Id. The court observed that although Con-
gress stated that it was not codifying the Second Circuit standard, debates over
earlier House and Senate bills indicated a contrary view. Indeed, these debates
included remarks that the Reform Act did specifically adopt the pre-existing stan-
dard and, at the same time, that Congress intended to raise the pleading standard
above that of the Second Circuit. See id. (citing 1844 FED. SEC. L. REP. 2 (1998)).
" See In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 550 (6th Cir. 1999);
Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1284 (11th Cir. 1999).
"' See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
"6 Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1284 (citing Cottage Savings Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S.
554 (1991) (noting that the Court would presume that Congress intended to codify
a particular legal doctrine because decisions establishing the doctrine were part of
the "contemporary legal context" in which Congress acted and because Congress
left undisturbed the legal principal during subsequent re-enactments)).
" See, e.g., Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 199-200 (1st Cir.
1999); Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1284; In re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F. Supp. 238, 240
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("Since the Reform Act nowhere defines what the 'required state of
mind' is for any of the kinds of actions that may be brought under this title, the
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3. The "Safe Harbor" and Contribution Provisions
This conclusion is supported by Congress' express pro-
scription of recklessness in other portions of the Reform
Act.'69 For example, § 21E of the Exchange Act, which pro-
vides a "safe harbor" from liability for certain persons on ac-
count of "forward-looking" statements, is the only provision of
the Reform Act that changes the "state of mind" standard for
liability to intent or actual knowledge in private securities ac-
tions. 7' Under this provision, a person cannot be liable in a
private action for any "forward-looking" statement if, among
other things, the plaintiffs fail to show "actual knowledge" on
the part of the defendants alleged to have made misleading or
untrue "forward-looking" statements.'' Therefore, if Con-
gress wanted to replace recklessness with actual knowledge
with respect to other allegedly misleading statements, it could
have done so expressly, as it did with the "safe harbor" provi-
sion. 17
2
Similarly, the Reform Act changed certain consequences of
liability, as opposed to standards of liability, on the basis of
the defendant's state of mind.7 3 Regarding contribution, a
new section of the Exchange Act, § 21D(g), provides that "[alny
covered person against whom a final judgment is entered in a
private action shall be liable for damages jointly and severally
only if the trier of fact specifically determines that such cov-
ered person knowingly committed a violation of the securities
laws."'74 For purposes of Rule 10b-5, "knowingly commits a
violation of the securities laws" is defined as knowledge that "a
definition must necessarily be found either elsewhere in the Exchange Act itself or
(if the action is judicially implied) in the existing case law.").
... See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B) (2000).
170 See id. The Reform Act also authorizes the SEC to sue aiders and abetters
but only where such persons "knowingly" provide substantial assistance to another
person in violation of the Exchange Act or any rules promulgated thereunder. See
id. § 78t(O.
171 Id. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B); see also Statement of Managers, H.R. CONF. REP. No.
104-369, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 1995 WL 709276. For an in depth
discussion of the "safe harbor" provision, see Avery, supra note 3, at 354-57.
1" See Greebel, 194 F.3d at 201; Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1284; In re Silicon
Graphics Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 995 (9th Cir. 1999) (Browning, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
17 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(2)(B)(i).
17, Id. § 78u-4(f)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
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representation is false or an omission renders a representation
false."'75 The definition explicitly eliminates reckless conduct
as a basis for inferring a knowing commission of a
violation.17
6
These two special provisions lead to several conclusions.
First, one should not infer that Congress generally eliminated
recklessness as a basis for any liability because it affirmatively
removed recklessness as a basis for liability under the Act's
"safe harbor" provision and as a basis for imposing joint and
several liability.'77 Indeed, both of these provisions are explic-
it, in direct contrast to the vague scienter provision in the
Reform Act. 7' Second, Congress was careful to insure that
the actual knowledge requirement for imposing joint and sev-
eral liability was restricted to only those provisions of the Act
and not to the provisions concerning liability."9 Indeed, §
78u-4(f)(1) expressly states that "nothing in this subsection
shall be construed to create, affect, or in any manner modify,
the standard for liability associated with any action arising
under the securities laws."' If Congress intended to alter
the general scienter requirement by restricting it to actual
knowledge, including this language would not make sense.'8 '
Therefore, while the Reform Act clarifies the pleading
requirements for alleging scienter, it does not address the
substantive definition of scienter.'8 ' Instead, it refers to the
"required state of mind," which, at the time Congress drafted
the Act, was clearly defined by the federal courts of appeals to
include reckless behavior. Accordingly, the plain text of the Act
makes it clear that the Reform Act did not eliminate reckless-
ness as a basis for liability, and therefore, the Ninth Circuit's
reliance on the Reform Act's legislative history to conclude
otherwise is unwarranted. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit extracted
from a purely procedural provision the incorrect conclusion
17 Id. § 78u-4(f)(10)(A).
... See id. § 78u-4(f)(10)(B). For a thorough discussion of the contribution provi-
sion, see Avery, supra note 3, at 364-66.
177 See Greebel, 194 F.3d at 200-01; Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 995
(Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
178 See Greebel, 194 F.3d at 201.
17 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1), with id. § 78u-4(f)(1).
18 Id. § 78u-4(f)(1).
... Greebel, 194 F.3d at 200-01.
82 See id.; Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1284 (11th Cir. 1999).
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that Congress eliminated a well-settled substantive standard,
putting the Ninth Circuit out in the cold as the only circuit
court to reach such a conclusion in the face of compelling evi-
dence to the contrary.183
4. Policy Considerations
In addition to the plain language of the Reform Act, the
policy behind the Act"" dictates the conclusion that reckless-
ness still satisfies the "state of mind" requirement."8 5 More-
over, the Commission argues forcefully that the Reform Act
made no change in the definition of scienter under federal
securities laws and that it is sufficient under the Act to state
with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that
the defendant acted recklessly.8 6 The SEC is uniquely quali-
fied to assess "the proper balance between the need to insure
adequate disclosure and the need to avoid the adverse conse-
quences of setting too low a threshold for civil liability."8 7
Therefore, the Commission supports a recklessness standard
for § 10(b) liability because such a standard is needed "to pro-
tect investors and the securities markets from fraudulent con-
duct and to protect the integrity of the disclosure process."'
Imposing a higher standard would impede the incentives for
corporations to conduct a full inquiry into potentially trouble-
" In re Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig., 195 F.3d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 1999)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) ("lilt is difficult to
know that the [Silicon Graphics] majority, in interpreting a statutory enactment
that so clearly is limited to dealing with the particularity of pleadings, decided to
change the substantive standard governing securities fraud.").
'' See supra Part I.B (discussing the impetus behind the Reform Act).
" See In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 535 (3d Cir. 1999); Walk-
er & Seymour, supra note 82, at 1027-28 ("Neither the Reform Act nor its legis-
lative history reflects any intention to eliminate recklessness as a basis of liability.
The recklessness standard has long been recognized by the federal courts and is
essential to investor protection.").
' See Silicon Graphics Brief, at http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/silicon.txt.
1E7 Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 995 (Browning, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (citing TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 n.10
(1976)).
'" Silicon Graphics Brief, at http'//wvw.sec.gov/news/extra/silicon.txt. Indeed, the
Commission often relies on the recklessness standard in its own law enforcement
cases. S. REP. No. 104-98 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 1995 WL
372783; accord Statement of Managers, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, reprinted in
1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 1995 WL 709276; see also Silicon Graphics Brief, supra.
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some or embarrassing areas, threatening the disclosure process
that makes US securities markets a model for markets world-
wide.189 A recklessness standard discourages deliberate igno-
rance, and it also prevents defendants from averting liability
merely because plaintiffs have the daunting task of proving
actual knowledge of fraud. Requiring plaintiffs to show that
the defendant acted with actual subjective intent could impose
serious burdens upon recovery in a § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5
claim.19 Accordingly, despite the Ninth Circuit's holding in
Silicon Graphics, the Reform Act should be construed as allow-
ing recklessness to continue to satisfy the scienter requirement
for a private securities fraud action brought under § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5.
B. The Procedural Issue: What Must Be Pleaded to Show a
Strong Inference of Scienter?
Compared to the courts' fairly consistent approach to the
substantive issue of the Reform Act, the federal courts of ap-
peals have been more varied in their approaches to the proce-
dural aspect of the Reform Act, i.e., the details needed in a
complaint to allow a securities fraud action to withstand a
motion to dismiss. Perhaps this difference is because Congress,
during consideration of the Reform Act, frequently referred to
the Second Circuit's two-prong pleading standard as a way of
defining its own position or encouraging a particular analysis
of the Act. 9' Therefore, the Reform Act's legislative history is
189 Silicon Graphics Brief, at http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/silicon.txt (citing Sec.
Litig. Reform Proposals-S.240, S.667, and H.R. 1058: Hearings before the
Subcomm. on Sec. of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
104th Cong. 251-52 (testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Securities and Ex-
change Commission)); see also supra Part I.B (discussing disclosure to investors).
" Brief for the SEC, amicus curiae, In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d
542 (6th Cir. 1999) (No. 97-2098), at http://securities.stanford.edu/briefscomshare/-
9702098/sec.html (quoting Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017,
1025 (6th Cir. 1979)) [hereinafter In re Comshare Briefi; see also Hackbart v.
Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1118 (10th Cir. 1982) ("[R]equiring the plaintiff to show
[conscious] intent would be unduly burdensome."); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon &
Co., 570 F.2d 38, 46-47 (2d. Cir 1978) ("To require in all types of [Rule] 10b-5
cases that a fact finder must find a specific intent to deceive or defraud would for
all intents and purposes disembowel the private cause of action under § 10(b).").
... See Phillips v. LCI Int'l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 620 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that
the legislative history of the Reform Act refers to the Second Circuit standard); see
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replete with inconsistent and contradictory statements that the
Reform Act either codifies or modifies the existing Second
Circuit standard.'92 Indeed, as one district court judge noted,
"[T]he Congressional byplay that accompanies the enactment of
a controversial law like the Reform Act inevitably yields a rich
cornucopia of legislative history on which courts of every appe-
tite can feed."" 3 The Reform Act's plain language merely re-
quires that the complaint "state with particularity facts giving
rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the
required state of mind."'94 However, the language of the Act
includes the "strong inference" aspect of the Second Circuit
standard, and the legislative history of the Act contains exten-
sive debate over the efficacy of the Second Circuit's "reckless-
ness" and "motive and opportunity" pleading methods. Since
the Reform Act does not explain how to meet the heightened
pleading standard, it suggests that Congress intended to leave
the issue to judicial interpretation.9
The most striking interpretation of the Reform Act's
heightened pleading standard was employed by the Ninth
Circuit in Silicon Graphics. In direct contrast to the other
circuits, the Ninth Circuit extracted haphazardly from the
Act's legislative history to support its holding that plaintiffs in
a private securities fraud action must allege conscious behavior
also supra note 75 and accompanying text.
" See Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 195 (1st Cir. 1999) (finding
that the legislative history is inconsistent on whether the Reform Act intended to
either embody or reject the Second Circuit pleading standard); see also infra note
203 and accompanying text.
"' In re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F. Supp. 238, 242 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing
ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS 64-65 (1997)). The First Circuit
apparently agrees, noting that the legislative history is "irretrievably conflicted"
regarding the methods of establishing a strong inference of scienter-"with all sides
finding some support for their position." Greebel, 194 F.3d at 192.
,.. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2000).
... The First Circuit remarked that the only agreement Congress apparently
reached was to disagree on the issue of the Second Circuit standards, and "to
leave such matters for courts to resolve." Greebel, 194 F.3d at 195; see also In re
Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 993 (9th Cir. 1999) (Browning, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (finding that Congress' decision not to
adopt or reject particular factual patterns that might satisfy the strong inference
standard meant that the "task was left to the courts"); In re Advanta Corp. Sec.
Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 534 (3d Cir. 1999) ("In our view, the fact that Congress con-
sidered inserting language directly addressing [the Second Circuit pleading stan-
dard], but ultimately chose not to, suggests that it intended to leave the matter to
judicial interpretation.").
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to withstand a motion to dismiss.' A careful and studied
look at the Reform Act's legislative history will reveal why the
majority's analysis in Silicon Graphics is flawed and therefore,
why the Supreme Court should reject the Ninth Circuit's hold-
ing. Additionally, a review of Congress' vision in implementing
the Act will show why the motive and opportunity standard
should be rejected, despite its support by the Second and Third
Circuits and the SEC. As this Note will emphasize, a more
reasoned resolution is for the Supreme Court to find that Con-
gress did not raise the scienter standard beyond recklessness
and that a strong inference of recklessness could be alleged by
circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or reckless-
ness, but not just by evidence of motive and opportunity.
1. An Examination of the Reform Act's Legislative History
The controversy over the Reform Act's "strong inference"
standard has its impetus in the Senate precursor to the bill-
S.240-in which the language originated.197 In its report to
the full Senate, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs explained the basis for this pleading stan-
dard:
The Committee does not adopt a new and untested pleading stan-
dard that would generate additional litigation. Instead, the Com-
mittee chose a uniform standard modeled upon the pleading stan-
dard of the Second Circuit. Regarded as the most stringent pleading
standard, the Second Circuit requires that the plaintiff plead facts
that give rise to a "strong inference" of defendant's fraudulent in-
tent. The Committee does not intend to codify the Second Circuit
case law interpreting this provision, although courts may find this
body of law instructive.19
During a subsequent floor debate, Senator Specter tried to
make this support of the Second Circuit standard even more
definitive. He offered an amendment closely tracking the lan-
"9 See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the Ninth Circuit's treatment of the Reform
Act's legislative history).
"9 The Senate bill required plaintiffs to allege "specific facts demonstrating the
state of mind of each defendant at the time the alleged violation occurred." S.240,
104th Cong., § 104 (1995), reprinted in 141 CONG. REc. S1078 (daily ed. Jan. 18,
1995), available at 1995 WL 18795.
198 S. REP. No. 104-98, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 1995 WL 372783.
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guage of the Second Circuit pleading standard.'99 The Senate
adopted this amendment, but it was deleted by the Conference
Committee. In the Statement of Managers, the Conference
Committee explained the standard that it adopted:
The Conference Committee language is based in part on the plead-
ing standard of the Second Circuit. The standard also is specifically
written to conform the language to Rule 9(b)'s notion of pleading
"With particularity." Regarded as the most stringent pleading stan-
dard, the Second Circuit requirement is that the plaintiff state facts
with particularity, and that these facts, in turn must give rise to a
"strong inference" of the defendant's fraudulent intent. Because the
Conference Committee intends to strengthen existing pleading stan-
dards, it does not intend to codify the Second Circuit's case law
interpreting this pleading standard.
2 1
The accompanying footnote stated, "For this reason, the Con-
ference Report chose not to include in the pleading standard
..9 See Amend. 1485, S.240, 104th Cong. (1995), reprinted in 141 CONG. REc.
S9170 (daily ed. June 27, 1995), available at 1995 WL 383008. The amendment
added a provision following the general requirement that the complaint allege facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state
of mind, which provided:
(2) strong inference of fraudulent intent. For purposes of paragraph (1), a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind may be estab-
lished either
(A) by alleging facts to show that the defendant had both motive and
opportunity to commit fraud; or
(B) by alleging facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of con-
scious misbehavior or recklessness by the defendant.
Id. Senator Specter specifically noted that his amendment was based on Second
Circuit case law, particularly Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d
46 (2d Cir. 1987). Id. at S9171 (statement of Sen. Specter). The Specter amend-
ment was passed by a vote of 52 to 47. Id. at S9201 (daily ed. June 28, 1995),
available at 1995 WL 382792. The Senate bill was passed on June 28, 1995 by a
vote of 70 to 29. See id. at S9219.
"' The Conference Committee addressed the differences between the House and
Senate versions of the Reform Act and released their report on November 28,
1995. See Statement of Managers, H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 1995 WL 709276. In addition to deleting the Specter
Amendment, the Conference Committee changed the language of the pleading
standard from "specifically allege" to "plead with particularity." This change was
based on the recommendation of the Judicial Conference that the provision be
amended to comply with the language of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, see id., which requires that "[iln all averments of fraud or mistake, the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity."
FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
"' Statement of Managers, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 1995 WL 709276.
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certain language relating to motive, opportunity, or reckless-
ness," 2°2 apparently referring to the Second Circuit's current
pleading standard.0 3 President Clinton vetoed the Reform
Act, citing the Statement of Managers as one of his reasons. In
the President's veto message he stated:
I believe that the pleading requirements of the Conference Report
with regard to a defendant's state of mind impose an unacceptable
procedural hurdle to meritorious claims being heard in Federal
courts. I am prepared to support the high pleading standard of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit-the highest pleading
standard of any Federal circuit court. But the conferees make crys-
tal clear in the Statement of Managers their intent to raise the
standard even beyond that level. I am not prepared to accept
that.
20 4
Subsequently, both houses of Congress overrode the President's
veto and enacted the Reform Act into law without any modifi-
cation to the pleading standard.
20 Id. at n.23.
21 In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 532 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting
that the footnote was "an apparent reference to Second Circuit case law interpret-
ing the pleading requirement for scienter"). Confusion and contradiction arose
because despite the fact that Congress explicitly rejected the Second Circuit stan-
dard, statements made by members of Congress indicate the contrary. For exam-
ple, during debate on the Senate floor, Senator Domenici, co-sponsor of the Reform
Act and one of the Conference Committee Managers, stated that "the conference
report adopts the pleading standard utilized by the [S]econd [Clircuit [C]ourt of
[Alppeals." 141 CONG. REC. S17,969 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Senator
Domenici), available at 1995 WL 713530. Senator Dodd, another Manager, explicit-
ly agreed with Senator Domenici's assertion. See id. at S17,959 (daily ed. Dec. 5,
1995) (statement of Senator Dodd), available at 1995 WL 713537.
204 Veto Message, H.R. DOC. No. 104-150, reprinted in 141 CONG. REC. H15,214
(daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995), available at 1995 WL 752858. President Clinton also
referred to the Specter amendment in his veto message. He stated that Congress'
deletion of the amendment, which specifically incorporated Second Circuit case law,
and its indication to "strengthen" the existing pleading requirements of the Second
Circuit shows that "the conferees meant to erect a higher barrier to bringing suit
than any now existing-one so high that even the most aggrieved investors with
the most painful losses may get tossed out of court before they have a chance to
prove their case." Id.
In floor debate following the President's veto, Senator Dodd reenforced his
position that contrary to the President's belief, the pleading provision in the Re-
form Act was the Second Circuit standard. 141 CONG. REC. S19,068 (daily ed. Dec.
21, 1995) (statement of Senator Dodd), available at 1995 WL 755363. Additionally,
Senator Domenici criticized President Clinton's reliance on the language in the
Statement of Managers, remarking, "A statement of managers is not law, everyone
knows that." Id. (statement of Senator Domenici).
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2. Two Approaches to Analyzing the Reform Act's
Legislative History
In rejecting recklessness as a sufficient basis for scienter
and circumstantial evidence of both recklessness and motive
and opportunity as appropriate methods for pleading scienter,
the Ninth Circuit grasped at the Reform Act's legislative histo-
ry, employing a flawed analysis and placing unwarranted reli-
ance on ambiguous statements. First, the court claimed that
the Conference Committee "implicitly rejected" the Second
Circuit's pleading standard215 when it declined to incorporate
the language in the Specter amendment.2 6 However, several
reasons show why this conclusion is untenable. First, the legis-
lative history demonstrates that the Committee rejected the
Specter Amendment because it was an "incomplete and inaccu-
rate" codification of Second Circuit case law2 7 and not be-
cause the Committee intended to proscribe the methods in
which a "strong inference" of the required state of mind may be
plead.0 In fact, the Managers reassured the amendment's
proponents that courts could use the Second Circuit test as
"guidance," even though the Reform Act did not expressly pro-
vide that plaintiffs could plead scienter using the two-prong
pleading standard.0 9 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit failed to
2. In re Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 978 (9th Cir. 1999) ("[Tlhe
joint conference committee . . . declined to incorporate the Specter Amendment in
the final version of the [Reform Act]. In doing so, they implicitly rejected the
Second Circuit's two-pronged test."). In coming to this conclusion, the court relied
upon Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186 (1974), for the proposition
that if the conference committee expressly declined to adopt proposed statutory
language, its action "strongly militates against a judgment that Congress intended
[the] result that it expressly declined to enact." Id. (quoting Gulf Oil Corp., 419
U.S. at 200).
" See supra note 199 and accompanying text (discussing Specter Amendment).
217 141 CONG. REC. S19,067 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (Senator Dodd quoting
from memorandum of Prof. Grundfest), available at 1995 WL 755363. In Senator
Dodd's view, the amendment completely omitted a critical qualification in the case
law: it failed to show that where motive is not apparent, a plaintiff may plead
scienter by identifying circumstances that indicate wrongful behavior, but "the
strength of the circumstantial allegations must be correspondingly greater" than
the number of cases. Id. at S17,960 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Senator
Dodd), available at 1995 WL 713530.
... Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 993 (Browning, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
21 Id. (citing 141 CONG. REC. S19,068 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of
Senator Dodd) ("We left out the guidance. That does not mean that you disregard
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recognize that if Congress had codified a recklessness standard
for pleading that would apply to all statements, which the
Specter Amendment proposed, that standard would be incon-
sistent with the provisions of the Reform Act requiring a differ-
ent scienter for certain statements.21 ° For example, the Re-
form Act's provision regarding "forward-looking" statements
requires that plaintiffs prove that such statements were made
with actual knowledge.21'
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit inappropriately relied
upon footnote 23 in the Statement of Managers212 to support
its holding."' The court appears to have determined that be-
cause footnote 23 referred to motive and opportunity and reck-
lessness, but not to conscious behavior, Congress must have in-
tended that only evidence of conscious behavior would suffice
to meet the strong inference test."4 This assumption is seri-
ously flawed. The Ninth Circuit ignored the plain fact that
Congress deleted not only the provision regarding motive and
opportunity and recklessness, but it also declined to include in
the Reform Act any language relating to "circumstantial evi-
dence of conscious misbehavior,"" 5 a variation of the second
approach to satisfying the Second Circuit pleading stan-
dard.216 In fact, the Silicon Graphics majority adopted a
pleading test---"deliberate or conscious recklessness"-that
explicitly focuses on conscious misbehavior." A more ratio-
nal explanation is that Congress declined to incorporate the
it.")). See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
210 Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 993 (Browning, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
211 See supra Part III.A.3 (discussing the "safe harbor" provision).
212 See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
213 Silicon Graphics Brief, at http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/silicon.txt ("The
court's apparent reliance on footnote 23 in the statement of managers to support
its holding .. . is misplaced.").
214 See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 978.
211 Press v. Chem. Inv. Serv. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting
Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994)) (allowing plain-
tiffs to prove scienter by alleging facts that constitute strong circumstantial evi-
dence of "conscious misbehavior" or recklessness).
216 Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 994 (Browning, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) ("[T]he majority does not suggest that despite this omission, con-
scious misbehavior no longer provides an appropriate basis for inferring scienter.");
see also Silicon Graphics Brief, at http-//www.sec.gov/news/extra/silicon.txt.
217 Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 979-80; see also supra notes 133 & 134 and
accompanying text.
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Second Circuit guidance because it intended only to adopt the
"strong inference" pleading standard and not to mandate or
proscribe particular factual circumstances that might satisfy
the standard, preferring to leave that task to the courts.218
Indeed, the First Circuit noted, "[I]t would be unusual for Con-
gress to legislate on what fact patterns could or could not
prove fraud or scienter."219 Therefore, a careful reading of the
Statement of Managers indicates no support for the conclusion
that the Conference Committee eliminated recklessness as
satisfying scienter or that it eliminated any method of proving
scienter in private securities actions."'
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit placed undue reliance on the
President's concern, announced in his veto message, that the
Reform Act would raise the pleading standard above the pre-
existing Second Circuit test.2 In doing so, the court incor-
rectly assumed that when Congress overrode the President's
veto, it agreed with the President that the Reform Act, as
passed, incorporated a pleading standard more demanding
than the Second Circuit standard.2 However, during the
Senate debate following the President's veto, the Reform Act's
supporters clearly disagreed with the President's interpretation
of the legislation and reaffirmed their view that the Reform
Act was faithful to the Second Circuit test.223 Therefore, it is
"' Id. at 993-94 (Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In
fact, Senator Dodd noted:
Illnstead of trying to take each case that came under the second circuit,
we are trying to get to the point where we would have well-pleaded
complaints. We are using the standards in the second circuit in that
regard, then letting the courts-as these matters will-test. They can then
refer to specific cases, the second circuit, otherwise, to determine if these
standards are based on facts and circumstances in a particular case.
141 CONG. REC. S17,960 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd), avail-
able at 1995 WL 713530; see also Silicon Graphics Brief, at http/ivwwv.sec.gov/-
news/extralsilicon.txt.
219 Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 195 (1st Cir. 1999).
22 See Silicon Graphics Brief, at http://www.sec.gov/news/extralsilicon.txt ("No-
where did the conference committee suggest that it was eliminating recklessness
as satisfying the scienter requirement, or indeed, that it was eliminating evidence
of motive and opportunity or circumstantial evidence of fraudulent intent (be it
conscious or reckless) as factors that the court might consider in determining
whether the strong inference had been established.").
"' Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 979; see also supra note 204 and accompanying
text (discussing the President's veto message).
21 Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 994 (Browning, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
223 E.g., 141 CONG. REC. S19,067 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (Senator Dodd quot-
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apparent that the Ninth Circuit, perhaps in haste to find sup-
port for its position, looked beyond the Reform Act's plain lan-
guage and employed an untenable analysis of congressional in-
tent to support its holding.
3. The Fate of the "Motive and Opportunity" Standard
Contrary to the Ninth Circuit's belief, all that can be ex-
tracted from a careful analysis of the Reform Act's legislative
history is that Congress did not mandate what factual circum-
stances must be alleged to plead scienter. Rather, the courts
are left with this daunting task. Therefore, it appears that
plaintiffs are permitted to use both allegations of motive and
opportunity and circumstantial evidence of conscious misbe-
havior or recklessness to allege scienter. After all, a look at the
cases reveals that congressional intent has been met. In fact,
in six of the seven cases discussed in this Note, dismissal was
affirmed, emphasizing Congress' vision in enacting the Reform
Act "to curtail the filing of meritless lawsuits."224 These cases
were all decided in favor of the defendants, regardless of the
court's position on the underlying Reform Act issues. 5
Nonetheless, the statistics paint a more dismal picture.
Since Congress passed the Reform Act, there has been an in-
crease in private securities fraud lawsuits, suggesting that
congressional intent may not yet be fully effectuated. Indeed,
ing from memorandum of Prof. Grundfest), available at 1995 WL 755363; id. at
S19,150 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995) (statement of Senator Domenici) ('The President
objected to the pleading standard. Yet it is the Second Circuit's pleading stan-
dard."), available at 1995 1rL 759560; id. at S19,068 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995)
(Statement of Rep. Lofgren) ("The President says he supports the second circuit
standard for pleading. So do I. That is what is included in this bill.").
Similarly, the First Circuit criticized such heavy reliance on the President's
veto message. The defendant in Greebel relied on the same flawed argument as
the defendant in Silicon Graphics. The First Circuit noted that "[w]hile the
President's view of what Congress meant has some informational value, we give
that view little weight: the real issue is what the intent was of Congress, not the
President." Greebel, 194 F.3d at 195.
224 For example, the Ninth Circuit observed that "[iln the absence of greater
particularity and more incriminating facts, we have no way of distinguishing [the
plaintiffs'1 allegations from countless 'fishing exhibitions' which the [Reform Act]
was designed to deter." Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 988.
' In the seventh case, the Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded a district
court decision declining to dismiss the claims. See Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc.,
187 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999).
[Vol. 66: 2
INTERPRETING THE REFORM ACT
commentators noted that "the Reform Act, rather than reduc-
ing the incidence of securities class actions, may have actually
had the perverse effect of increasing the number of issuers
sued."226 Precisely, as of January 20, 2001, 923 companies
have been sued in 924 federal class actions filed since 1996,
the year after Congress passed the Reform Act. 7 In 1998, at
least 235 companies were named defendants in federal class
action securities lawsuits-a record high number-surpassing
pre-Reform Act figures.28 Currently, the litigation rate is
close to one lawsuit a day for every trading day that the stock
market is open.229 Additionally, class actions have had an im-
mense impact on the judiciary. An average securities class
action requires more judicial time than either the average civil
action or non-class action securities fraud case. Such reali-
ties serve no one's interest.
2 Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, Securities Class Action Litigation
in Q1 1998: A Report to NASDAQ from the Stanford Law School Securities Class
Action Clearinghouse, at Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse,
http://securities.stanford.edu/reportlnasdaq/98ql.html (June 2, 1998). Grundfest and
Perino explain this phenomenon:
Such an equilibrium is possible if the Reform Act simultaneously made
securities litigation riskier (because it increased the number of actions
dismissed in pretrial proceedings) while also decreasing the relative in-
vestment that the plaintiffs' law firm would have to make in each case
(because the Act's discovery stay means that dismissals would occur be-
fore expensive pretrial proceedings commence).
Id.
' Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, http://securities.stanford.edu
(last modified Jan. 30, 2001).
"3 In 1994, the year before the Reform Act was promulgated, 227 companies
were named defendants in private securities fraud actions. Securities Fraud Litiga-
tion Sets Record in 1998, Companies Sued at a Rate Close to One a Day, Press
Release, Stanford, CA, at httpl/securities.stanford.edunews/990125/pressrel.html
(Jan. 27, 1999). Since 1996, 923 companies have been sued in federal court. Stan-
ford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, http://securities.stanford.edu (visited
Jan. 30, 2001). Also, since that time, the number of class actions filed in federal
courts has increased almost two-fold: 110 cases were filed in 1996, 234 cases were
filed in 1998, and 195 cases were filed in 2000. Id. Nonetheless, the number of
class action lawsuits filed in 2000 is down from the number filed in 1999-206. Id.
22 Securities Fraud Litigation Sets Record in 1998, Companies Sued at a Rate
Close to One a Day, Press Release, Stanford, CA, at http://securities.stanford.edu/-
news/990125/pressrel.html (Jan. 27, 1999).
"' Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, Securities Litigation Reform: The
First Year's Experience, at http'//securities.standford.edulreportlpslra-yrl/index.html
(visited Feb. 10, 2000).
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Therefore, the equivocal aftermath of the Reform Act sup-
ports the notion that the issues left unsettled by the Act de-
serve careful attention by the courts to ensure that Congress'
overall goals are met. Private anti-fraud actions are an essen-
tial supplement to the SEC's own enforcement efforts.21 But,
at the same time, investors are not well-served by frivolous
lawsuits. 212 Thus, courts should employ a delicate balancing
test when determining the methods that will suffice to allege
scienter under the Reform Act. The Reform Act attempts to
balance competing interests by raising the threshold for plead-
ing fraud to exclude non-meritorious cases early in the litiga-
tion, thereby avoiding the often enormous costs that discovery
can impose on defendants. However, courts must be mindful
that setting the Act's pleading threshold too high would create
a bar to meritorious claims, a result Congress did not intend.
Regarding the procedural issue, it would be nonsensical to
eliminate recklessness as a basis for pleading scienter if, as
this Note discusses, circuit courts all around the country have
concluded that recklessness suffices to establish liability under
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. However, eliminating motive and op-
portunity as a ground for pleading scienter keeps the balance
between the Reform Act's competing interests in check.233 In-
deed, the Eleventh Circuit declined to adopt the motive and
opportunity standard because "the clear purpose of the Reform
Act was to curb abusive securities litigation," and because the
court believed that "the motive and opportunity analysis is
inconsistent with that purpose."234 Moreover, courts rejected
the motive and opportunity standard, relying on the same logic
that they used to support the recklessness pleading standard.
231 See sources cited supra notes 2 & 3 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 4, 41-47 and accompanying text.
' The Eleventh Circuit noted that if courts let private securities fraud class
actions proceed to discovery on mere allegations of motive and opportunity, such a
practice would "upset the delicate balance of providing a remedy for genuine fraud
while preventing abusive strike suits that the Reform Act sought to achieve."
Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting
Carley Capital Group v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1339
(N.D. Ga. 1998)).
1 Id. Apparently the Third Circuit agrees with this contention because it noted
that "[plermitting blanket assertions of motive and opportunity to serve as a basis
for liability under the Exchange Act would undermine the most rigorous pleading
standard Congress has established." In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525,
535 (3d Cir. 1999).
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For instance, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the Reform
Act "makes no express mention of the motive and opportunity
test developed in the Second Circuit, and certainly does not ex-
pressly codify it.""5 Furthermore, both the Eleventh and
Sixth Circuits distinguished the motive and opportunity prong
from the recklessness prong by recognizing that evidence of a
defendant's motive and opportunity does not constitute a "state
of mind" for purposes of § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 liability. 6 For
this reason, those circuits concluded that plaintiffs may not
establish a strong inference of scienter under the Reform Act
merely by alleging facts showing a motive and opportunity
"where those facts do not simultaneously establish that the
defendant acted recklessly or knowingly, or with the required
state of mind."237 Lastly, the Eleventh Circuit noted that un-
like the well-established and uniformly recognized case law
finding that recklessness suffices for liability under Rule 10b-5,
"the motive and opportunity analysis was certainly not so well-
established throughout the circuits at the time that the Reform
Act was passed that it was codified sub silentio."238 Therefore,
while evidence supports the contention that the Reform Act
meant to codify recklessness as a sufficient method to establish
liability, it does not support the conclusion that Congress in-
tended to codify the "lesser-known," "lesser-accepted," and
"certainly not well-established" method of pleading scienter by
alleging motive and opportunity to commit fraud.239
Nonetheless, rejecting motive and opportunity as a basis
for proving scienter does not mean that such allegations have
no place in securities litigation. On the contrary, even those
' Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1285.
2" See id. at 1285-86; In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 551 (6th
Cir. 1999).
_ In re Comshare, 183 F.3d at 551; accord Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1286 (noting
that, unlike recklessness, motive and opportunity is not a substantive state of
mind standard and concluding that "the Reform Act did not codify the motive and
opportunity analysis").
' In fact, the Eleventh Circuit stated that only the Second and Ninth Circuits
applied the motive and opportunity analysis before the Reform Act's passage.
Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1286. Furthermore, within the Second Circuit, the court recog-
nized that the motive and opportunity test has been applied in a "seemingly in-
consistent fashion." Id. (comparing In re Time Warner, Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259,
259 (2d Cir. 1993), with Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir.
1994)).
'9 Id. at 1286-87.
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courts rejecting the standard recognize that facts regarding
motive and opportunity may be relevant to alleging situations
from which a strong inference of scienter may be inferred and
may occasionally rise to the level of creating such an infer-
ence. 24" These courts are merely stating that "the bare plead-
ing of motive and opportunity" does not, by itself, suffice to
establish the required state of mind.24'
CONCLUSION
Although the circuit courts have reached fairly consistent
results in applying the Reform Act's heightened pleading stan-
dard, they are sharply divided on two crucial issues. Without
intervention and clarification from the Supreme Court, the
disposition of private securities fraud cases will continue to fall
at the whim of a particular court's interpretation of the Reform
Act's requirements.242 Since defendants frequently file mo-
tions to dismiss securities fraud complaints on the basis that
plaintiffs have failed to properly plead state of mind, the via-
bility of a securities class action can turn on the level of partic-
ularity that is required and the types of allegations that suffice
to aver scienter. Such uncertainty concerning an important
issue of federal law cannot persist.
Thus, the Supreme Court should impose a national plead-
ing standard to create uniformity among the lower federal
courts. First, the Court should resolve the uncertainty sur-
rounding the meaning of recklessness. Although every circuit
court has permitted some variant of recklessness, and virtually
... In re Comshare, 183 F.3d at 551 (citing In re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F.
Supp. 238, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)); accord Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d
185, 197 (1st Cir. 1999); Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1286. But see In re Comshare Brief
at n.46, at http://securities.stanford.edu/briefs/comshare/9702098/sec.html (stating
that the SEC disfavors an approach that allows motive and opportunity to be used
simply as factors to be considered in evaluating circumstantial evidence of con-
scious misbehavior or recklessness).
241 Comshare, 183 F.3d at 551; accord Greebel, 194 F.3d at 197 (rejecting the
argument that "facts showing motive and opportunity can never be enough to
permit the drawing of a strong inference of scienter"); Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1285.
242 One commentator has noted that the uncertainty arising from the Reform
Act has turned the litigation of motions to dismiss and for summary judgment in
securities class actions into a "game of roulette," the outcome of which depends on
how a particular judge interprets the state of mind requirement. Giuffra, Strike
Suit, supra note 29, at A45.
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every circuit court has cited the Sundstrand definition of reck-
lessness, there is great disparity regarding the interpretation
of that definition. Second, the Court should mandate that a
strong inference of scienter can be alleged only by facts consti-
tuting strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior
or recklessness and not just by facts indicating motive and
opportunity to commit fraud. There is simply nothing in either
the Reform Act's plain language or legislative history that
supports the conclusion that allegations of motive and opportu-
nity alone are sufficient to impose on defendants and courts
the huge expense of a securities fraud class action. An addi-
tional policy consideration strongly supports rejecting such a
standard: naming a party in a civil suit for fraud should not be
viewed lightly.243 Plaintiffs can easily craft a complaint that
alleges violations of the securities laws,2 but defendants can
get no legal redress for the serious injury to reputation that an
unwarranted fraud claim can bring.245 Indeed, the Eleventh
Circuit recognized the danger of accepting motive and opportu-
nity as evidence of scienter when it noted that "greed is a ubiq-
uitous motive, and corporate insiders and upper management
always have the opportunity to lie and manipulate." 6
Surprisingly, at this time no party has petitioned the Su-
preme Court for certiorari. Nevertheless, a quick resolution of
this debate is essential because a Supreme Court ruling will
provide a meaningful and comprehensive heightened pleading
standard that will guide courts and parties in separating the
meritless securities class action complaints, which should be
dismissed at the pleading stage, from the worthy ones that
should proceed-a practice that serves everyone's interest.
Janine C. Guido
24 Statement of Managers, H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 1995 WL 709276.
21 S. REP. No. 104-98, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 1995 WL 372783.
2. Statement of Managers, H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 1995 WL 709276.
21' Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1286 (quoting Carley Capital Group v. Deloitte & Tou-
che, L.L.P., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1339 (N.D. Ga. 1998)).
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